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Darian M. Ibrahim 
Abstract 
This Article on “intrapreneurship” has several goals. First, it 
points out that while much of the legal literature on innovation is 
concerned with startups (entrepreneurship), the innovation that 
takes place inside our largest corporations (intrapreneurship) is 
substantial, important, and understudied. Second, the Article 
observes that while large technology corporations that used to be 
startups may remain intrapreneurial in culture, intrapreneurship 
is less common in the aggregate than we might expect. Reasons 
include organizational bureaucracy, laws favoring 
entrepreneurship, and what Clayton Christensen (Harvard 
Business School) calls “the innovator’s dilemma.” The innovator’s 
dilemma is, put simply, that good management causes large 
corporations to please existing customers with new and improved 
products at the expense of cultivating disruptive innovations that 
could replace those products altogether. Third, the Article detours 
to corporate law, which might, as a descriptive matter, play at the 
margins of the innovator’s dilemma and the 
entrepreneurial/intrapreneurial balance. Finally, the Article 
explores a hybrid approach—corporate venture capital—that 
combines entrepreneurial and intrapreneurial advantages. In 
corporate venture capital, a large corporation’s venture arm can 
invest in promising startups, and thus share in disruptive gains, 
without having to overcome obstacles to developing those projects 
internally. 
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I. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is sexy. Our business lore includes Steve 
Jobs creating Apple Computer in his garage1 and Mark 
Zuckerberg creating Facebook in his Harvard dorm room.2 
                                                                                                     
 1. See WALTER ISAACON, STEVE JOBS 67 (2011) (pointing out that the Jobs’s 
house became the assembly point for Apple I boards). 
 2. See BEN MEZRICH, THE ACCIDENTAL BILLIONAIRES: THE FOUNDING OF 
FACEBOOK: A TALE OF SEX, MONEY, GENIUS AND BETRAYAL 153 (2010) (“In the 
incorporation documents, they’d laid out the ownership of [Facebook] as they’d 
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Innovation takes flight when these entrepreneurs bravely forego 
the safety of a traditional job and create a new firm (a “startup”) 
to pursue an exciting new idea.3 Everyone, including politicians4 
and law professors (especially this one5), likes entrepreneurship. 
What receives less attention is innovation that takes place 
inside our largest corporations, referred to as intrapreneurship. 
This Article explores the world of intrapreneurship. It is also the 
first systematic academic effort to study how the law, and in 
particular corporate law, might affect the 
intrapreneurial/entrepreneurial balance.6 I note at the outset 
that many of these effects, to the extent they are having an 
influence, are likely at the margins. They are also probably 
unintended effects, as Delaware judges are not deciding fiduciary 
duty cases brought against corporate management with 
innovation ramifications in mind.7 Still, much like a prior 
                                                                                                     
agreed upon in Mark’s dorm room.”). 
 3. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 289, 289–90 (1999) (commenting that “the prototypical start-up involves an 
employee leaving her job with an idea”).  
 4. On legal preferences granted to startups and other small businesses, 
see Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 
719 (2014) [hereinafter Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors] (analyzing why “Congress 
and private institutions have been acting to incentivize, support, and reward 
entrepreneurship through the law to stimulate the economy”); Mirit Eyal-
Cohen, Down-Sizing the Little Guy Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1041, 1046 (2013) [hereinafter Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing] (explaining some of 
the policy considerations behind the legal preferences granted to small 
businesses). 
 5. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (citing favorably statistics that show “[i]n 2008 public 
companies that were once venture-backed accounted for more than 12 million 
U.S. jobs and $2.9 trillion in revenues, which equates to 21 percent of U.S. GDP” 
(quoting Press Release, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, National Venture Capital 
Association Releases Recommendations to Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Industry (Apr. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review))).  
 6. This Article, however, is by no means the first law review article to 
discuss the concept of intrapreneurship in general. See Bankman & Gilson, 
supra note 3, at 299–308 (examining why large corporations lose innovative 
employees to startups); see also Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing, supra note 4, at 1087 
(“Intrapeneurship denotes business units with large and established 
corporations that create breakthrough inventions that increase their 
entrepreneurial value.”). 
 7. See Brent J. Horton, Modifying Fiduciary Duties in Delaware: 
Observing Ten Years of Decisional Law, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, app. I (2016) 
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interesting essay explores how tort law’s deference to custom 
might unintentionally hinder innovation,8 this Article explores 
how corporate law might be playing an unanticipated role in the 
optimal intrapreneurial/entrepreneurial balance we observe.9 
This Article also explores a hybrid approach—corporate venture 
capital—that may be the best of both worlds.10 Corporate venture 
capital programs allow large corporations to keep abreast of, and 
participate in, exciting new technologies without having to spend 
internal R&D dollars or overcome bureaucratic obstacles ever 
present in large organizations.11 
Before discussing these original contributions, this Article 
explores intrapreneurship as a descriptive phenomenon.12 
Intrapreneurial corporations have long existed, from 3M (whose 
employees developed the Post-It Note) to Lockheed Martin (whose 
“skunkworks” group developed the U-2 Spy Plane).13 Now much 
intrapreneurship occurs in the technology stalwarts that began 
as startups (e.g., Google and Amazon).14 However, given that 
large corporations have advantages over startups in terms of 
                                                                                                     
(showcasing thirty-six cases supporting the proposition that “the purpose of the 
duty of loyalty is in large measure to prevent the exploitation by a fiduciary of 
his self-interest to the disadvantage of the minority”). 
 8. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 285, 286 (2008) (“Academic discussions are typically confined to 
the domains of patent and trade secret law.”). The authors note that their 
“[a]rticle highlights a previously underappreciated connection between 
innovation and tort law.” Id. at 286. 
 9. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that “the business judgment rule and the 
duty to monitor” encourage intrapreneurship). 
 10. See infra Part IV (describing corporate venture capital, detailing 
“competitive advantages of corporate venture capital,” and showing evidence of 
the varied success of corporate venture capital). 
 11. See Rami Rahal, Will Corporate Venture Capital Disrupt the 
Traditional Investment Ecosystem?, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 16, 2014), 
www.entrepreneur.com/article/240904 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (discussing 
the advantages a corporate venture fund has for large corporations) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See infra Part II (breaking down the difference between 
“intrapreneurship” and entrepreneurship, laying out the practical importance of 
“intrapreneurship,” and expounding the innovator’s dilemma). 
 13. See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text (presenting examples of 
numerous corporations founded throughout the twentieth century that have 
successfully implemented “intrapreneurship”). 
 14. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (revealing that various 
Silicon Valley tech giants have programs that encourage intrapreneurship). 
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resources, employee talent, and production economies of scale, it 
is surprising to not find even more intrapreneurship relative to 
entrepreneurship.15 
Entrepreneurship is always going to be more attractive to 
some individuals.16 There are psychic rewards for being one’s own 
boss17 and financial payoffs upon success that a large corporation 
has difficulty matching.18 Corporate law’s limited liability, 
meaning the founder’s personal wealth is not at stake should the 
venture fail, also drives entrepreneurial risk-taking.19 But on 
balance, why don’t the large corporation’s competitive advantages 
in terms of attracting and retaining innovators result in less 
startups and more intrapreneurship? 
The existing legal literature identifies one possible reason—
ownership rights to intellectual property developed while working 
for a large corporation.20 I will discuss that briefly, recognizing 
that it is not my domain and leaving it to the IP scholars.21 I also 
briefly discuss other possible explanations.22 The Article then 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the 
Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 214 (1993) (“[L]arge 
companies had significant advantages in R&D, including superior 
diversification and marketing . . . , effectively unlimited lives . . . , superior 
laboratories and research teams, and greater financial resources.”). 
 16. See Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can 
Do About It, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 817 (2007) (writing on the unique 
characteristics that distinguish entrepreneurs from other civilians). 
 17. See id. at 825 (“[E]vidence supports the notion that self-employment 
offers substantial nonpecuniary benefits, such as being your own boss.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 18. See Barton H. Hamilton, Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Returns of Self-Employment, 108 J. POL. ECON. 604, 629 (2000) 
(affirming that there is “some support for the superstar model [of 
entrepreneurship] since a handful of entrepreneurs earn substantial returns in 
self-employment”).  
 19. See D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1566–67 (2013) (describing how limited 
liability encourages entrepreneurship). 
 20. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of 
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 885, 896 (2010) (“A number of scholars have focused on the risk to the 
employee of merely disclosing the innovation; by doing so, the employee will 
compromise her intellectual property.”). 
 21. See infra Part II.C (observing that when a corporate employee invents a 
disruptive innovation at work ownership rights are unclear). 
 22. See infra Part II.C (mentioning that compensation leads to technology 
1746 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1741 (2016) 
turns to a business school theory of much buzz—Clayton 
Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma.23 Christensen argues 
that well-managed large corporations cater to existing customers 
and improve upon existing products (i.e., sustaining innovations) 
rather than pursue disruptive innovations that create new 
products and new demand.24 Eventually, however, experience 
shows that entrepreneurial disruptive innovations invade or 
occupy the large corporation’s space.25 This is the innovator’s 
dilemma: stick with a successful strategy and eventually be 
disrupted by a startup.26 
Christensen claims that solving the innovator’s dilemma—
and having a large corporation pursue a concurrent 
                                                                                                     
companies losing employees to startups and “an employee gets a psychic reward 
from ‘going it alone’ and becoming a successful entrepreneur”). 
 23. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: 
THE REVOLUTIONARY BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS (1997) 
[hereinafter THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA] (considering the difficulties that 
established companies have when dealing with disruptive technology). 
Christensen’s novel has garnered top business industry accolades since its 
publication in 1997. See Dan Ackman, The 20 Most Influential Business Books, 
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/2002/09/30/0930booksintro.html 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (praising distinguished business books that have 
come out within the past 20 years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Aiming High: We Launch a Quarterly Review of Business Books 
by Naming Six of the Best, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18894875 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (examining 
six books from the past fifty years which “shape[d] the business world”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Global Business Book Awards, J. M. 
MCELLIGOTT, http://www.bookawards.bizland.com/ financial_times.htm (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (naming Christensen’s book the “Best Business Book” of 
1998, as determined by the Financial Times and Booz-Allen & Hamilton) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at xxii (“If good 
management practice drives the failure of successful firms faced with disruptive 
technology change, then the usual answers to companies, problems—planning 
better, working harder, becoming more customer-driven, and taking a longer-
term perspective—all exacerbate the problem.”). 
 25. See id. at 48 (“Because the experience was so archetypical, the struggle 
of Seagate Technology, the industry’s dominant maker of 5.25-inch drives, to 
successfully commercialize the disruptive 3.5-inch drive is recounted in 
detail . . . .”). 
 26. See id. at xxvi (“In many instances, leadership in sustaining 
innovations—above which information is known and for which plans can be 
made—is not competitively important. It is in disruptive innovations, where we 
know least about the market, that there are such strong first-mover advantages. 
This is the innovator’s dilemma.”). 
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sustaining/disruptive innovation approach—requires reducing 
two important asymmetries that exist within large corporations.27 
These are asymmetric motivation (only caring about upstream 
movements to higher-end products and customers)28 and 
asymmetric information (organizational hurdles that prevent 
disruptive threats and potential responses to them from filtering 
up from employees to senior management).29 
Much like corporate law could tip the scales toward forming a 
startup by offering the founders limited liability,30 corporate law 
can also speak to the innovator’s dilemma.31 First, the business 
judgment rule—as central a principle to corporate law as limited 
liability32—prompts senior management (the CEO and board of 
directors) to pursue a disruptive innovation even if it might fail.33 
Locating intrapreneurial ventures in new organizational units or 
corporate subsidiaries is a way to pursue disruptive innovation 
while still catering to the corporation’s core business.34 Market 
                                                                                                     
 27. See id. at 33–68, 89–110 (advancing that the resolution to the 
innovator’s dilemma lies within solving asymmetric motivation and asymmetric 
information). 
 28. See id. at 89–110 (observing that “the prospects for growth and 
improved profitability in upmarket value networks” is attractive and “that it is 
not unusual to see well-managed companies leaving . . . their original customers 
as they search for customers at higher price points”). 
 29. See id. at 33–68 (explaining that “[m]ost proposals to innovate are 
generated from deep within the organization not the top” and as a result 
“middle managers play a critical . . . role in screening these projects” however 
“[t]hese managers can’t package and throw their weight behind every idea”). 
 30. See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 19 (positing that limited liability 
encourages entrepreneurs to “engage in transactions because they no longer 
have to take an ‘all or nothing’ approach to starting a business”). 
 31. See infra Part IV (arguing that the business judgement rule and the 
duty to monitor reduce the information asymmetry problems in large 
corporations). 
 32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 81, 81 (2004) (describing the business judgment rule 
as “corporate law’s central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders”). 
 33. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (asserting that the business 
judgment rule drives risk taking within corporations). 
 34. See, e.g., Nathan Furr & Daniel Snow, The Prius Approach, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/11/the-prius-approach (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016) (tackling how large corporations should react to the threat of 
disruption based on whether such disruption is already underway, has just 
begun, or is in the distant future) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
1748 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1741 (2016) 
pressures will ultimately drive business decisions, but corporate 
law can also reduce the asymmetric motivation problem and 
encourage corporations to pursue disruptive innovation.35 
Second—and less intuitively—corporate law might also 
reduce the asymmetric information problem.36 Christensen 
contends that skilled employees do sometimes see disruption 
coming, and develop a response to it, but those ideas do not reach 
the senior management level.37 Delaware law recognizes a duty to 
monitor, part of the duty of loyalty, which mandates that the 
board of directors install a compliance system to monitor for 
employee illegal activity.38 The duty to monitor does not reach 
business risks,39 whether from overexposure to subprime 
mortgages40 or threats from disruptive innovation.41 However, it 
can work in that way indirectly, when coupled with market 
pressures, in ways this Article will explore.42 Consequently, the 
duty to monitor, albeit indirectly and unintentionally, may help 
innovation-related information reach senior management who 
can then act on it.43 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 35. See infra notes 163–179 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
relationship between the business judgment rule, intrapreneurship, and risk 
taking). 
 36. See infra Part IV.B (asserting that the duty to monitor can help solve 
part of the innovator’s dilemma). 
 37. See THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 33–34, 94–97 
(specifying the organizational hurdles that get in the way of creating disruptive 
technologies within a large corporation). 
 38. See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 
738 (2010) (considering the duty to monitor and what requirements it imposes 
on the board of directors).  
 39. See Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 253, 
259 (2014) (clarifying that the duty to monitor business risk does not exist 
within the corporate law framework of duties). 
 40. See infra notes 200–212 and accompanying text (exploring the case of 
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 41. See infra Part IV.B.2 (doubting that Delaware judges would hold board 
of directors legally liable for failing to identify a business risk). 
 42. See infra notes 220–224 and accompanying text (explicating Ed Rock’s 
and Melvin Eisenberg’s argument that courts in Delaware provide standards of 
conduct). 
 43. See infra Part IV.B (contending that although Delaware courts will not 
impose legal liability for failing to appreciate business risks from disruptive 
innovation, Delaware courts can affect director behavior). 
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Finally, the Article pivots to perhaps the best of both worlds: 
corporate venture capital.44 Large corporations can and do form 
venture arms to fund startups, which allow the corporations to 
pursue sustaining innovations in-house while also sharing in 
disruptive activity through startup ownership.45 I will argue that 
corporate venture capital is theoretically equipped to outperform 
private venture capital in funding startups, although corporate 
venture capital’s actual success is varied.46 
Before proceeding further, let me be clear that this is largely 
a descriptive rather than normative Article. For example, I do not 
argue for a change in corporate law to make large corporations 
even more intrapreneurial. Indeed, I do not even know if that is 
desirable from an aggregate social welfare perspective. On the 
whole, it should not matter who is innovating—startups or large 
corporations. Nor should it matter who funds innovation, private 
or corporate venture capitalists. This Article is simply an inquiry 
into the distributive, or the relative balance between where 
innovation happens, who funds it, and why.  
II. Intrapreneurship and the Innovator’s Dilemma 
This Part asks a series of preliminary questions. First, 
what is “intrapreneurship” and how does it differ from 
entrepreneurship? Second, what do we know about 
intrapreneurial companies? And third, what reasons can we find 
for why even more innovation doesn’t take place inside large 
corporations given the many advantages they appear to enjoy 
over startups? 
                                                                                                     
 44. See infra Section V (proposing that corporate venture capital might be 
the best way for large corporations to develop intrapreneurship). 
 45. See Josh Lerner, Corporate Venturing, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/10/corporate-venturing (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting 
that “companies as diverse as Google, BMW and General Mills are 
complementing traditional R&D by joining with other investors to put money in 
promising start-ups”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 46. Infra Section V.B. 
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A. Intrapreneurship and Entrepreneurship Differentiated 
The basic difference between intrapreneurship and 
entrepreneurship is that intrapreneurship is innovative activity 
that happens within a large, established firm,47 whereas 
entrepreneurship is innovative activity that is pursued through a 
new firm (a startup) established primarily for that purpose.48 An 
“entrepreneur assumes the risk of the venture, generally by 
investing his or her own capital and reputation and by forsaking 
a guaranteed income,”49 whereas an intrapreneur is commonly 
thought of as an employee inside a large corporation who stays 
in-house to pursue her idea rather than leaving to form a 
startup50 (although I will conceive of the employee and 
management team together as the true intrapreneur). 
Entrepreneurship is glorified in our collective mindset.51 
Joseph Bankman and Ronald Gilson write that “in Silicon Valley, 
the defining myth takes as its stage David Packard’s or Steve 
Jobs’ garage . . . . In this community, the myth is taken seriously. 
Over and over again, people set out on the path of heroes: They 
leave their comfortable, secure jobs, and start from scratch.”52 
                                                                                                     
 47. Gifford Pinchot is credited with coining the term “intrapreneur” to 
“describe a person who creates innovation of any kind within an organization.” 
Timothy D. Schellhardt, DAVID in GOLIATH: Some Giant Companies Are 
Particularly Good at Fostering an Entrepreneurial Spirit. Here’s How They do It, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1996, at R14; see also Art Fry, The Post-It Note: An 
Intrapreneurial Success, 52 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 3, 4 (1987) 
(“‘Intrapreneuring’ is a word coined by Gifford Pinchot in his book, 
Intrapreneuring. We had intrapreneurs for years at 3M, but didn’t know what to 
call them.”). 
 48. See D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneurship: Do 
Courts Matter?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 356 (2006) (defining 
entrepreneurship as “‘getting novel things done’ by new for-profit enterprises,” 
yet not discussing “entrepreneurial activities by established firms”). 
 49. David E. Polzen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 283, 285 (2008). 
 50. See Patrina Ozurumba, Girl Power: How Female Entrepreneurs Can 
Overcome Barriers to Successful Businesses, 34 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 24, 37 
(2012) (“[A]n intrapreneur is an employee within an organization who 
undertakes innovative internal business development initiatives.”). 
 51. See Polzen, supra note 49, at 286 (“Entrepreneurs, in the American 
imagination, are leaders, innovators, pioneers, problem solvers, and takers; they 
are diligent, persistent, charismatic, dynamic, imaginative, and 
resourceful . . . .”). 
 52. Bankman & Gilson, supra note 6, at 289–90. 
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Similarly, John Coyle and Gregg Polsky observe that Silicon 
Valley engineers are “willing to accept lower salaries and fewer 
perks in exchange for . . . the intangible benefits of participating 
in a startup in Silicon Valley, where entrepreneurship is 
cherished.”53 
Not only does entrepreneurship dominate in cultural and 
popular significance, these social norms are also embedded in our 
legal system.54 Mirit Eyal-Cohen has detailed the benefits that 
the legal system grants small businesses (which include startups) 
simply due to their size.55 As a descriptive matter, she notes that 
these benefits—which include the ease of complying with 
securities laws56 and lower patent application fees57—are 
available to startups but not to large corporations.58 As a 
normative matter, she argues that this “legal favoritism of small 
entities results in the waste of revenues and the misallocation of 
government resources” and that “[t]his occurs because the rules 
governing the allocation of benefits focus on firm size,”59 even if 
size is not the best proxy for innovation.60 
                                                                                                     
 53. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 291 
(2013). 
 54. See Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors, supra note 4, at 719 (“Our legal system 
is full of benefits granted to small entities.”). 
 55. See id. at 742–46 (arguing that in response to small businesses failing 
over time Congress started to favor small businesses); Eyal-Cohen, Down-
Sizing, supra note 4, at 1068–69  (detailing the rationale behind small business 
favoritism in the eyes of the law). 
 56. See Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing, supra note 4, at 1065–86 (“Securities 
laws govern business entities’ abilities to access public capital markets. These 
laws treat small entities favorably by granting them more relaxed registration 
and reporting requirements.”). 
 57. Id. at 1076–78 (“[A] key part of the statutory patent fee structure is a 
two-tier free system, which provides small entities with discounted rates for fees 
required for application, issuance, search, and maintenance of patents.”). 
 58. Id. at 1051 (“Entrepreneurship has been commonly equated with small-
business ownership, and it has been used to justify regulatory concessions.”). 
 59. Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors, supra note 4, at 721. Notably for purposes 
of my argument, Eyal-Cohen thinks preferential legal treatment should be 
granted to businesses that are truly innovative, whether startups or large 
corporations. See id. at 763–65 (proposing a conceptual model that aims to 
determine a firm’s entrepreneurial character by weighting the firm’s age, 
knowledge procurement ability, innovation yield, labor expansion, and 
entrepreneurial success). 
 60. See Thomas J. Chemmanur, Elena Loutskina & Xuan Tin, Corporate 
Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2434, 2434 
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Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that legal academics focus 
on startups, including their legal organization,61 financing,62 
governance,63 and exit mechanisms.64 Conversely, Gordon Smith 
and Masako Ueda observe that “[s]cholarly interests in 
intrapreneurship are clustered around the issue of how to 
circumvent inertia in established firms and to get novel things 
done . . . .”65 Thus, intrapreneurship is viewed as the study of 
overcoming organizational bureaucracy rather than a topic for 
legal scholars.66 But it is richer than that. 
                                                                                                     
(2013) (analyzing “how corporate venture capital (CVC) differs from independent 
venture capital (IVC) in nurturing innovation [through patents] in 
entrepreneurial firms”). 
 61. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 227–28 (2010) 
(asserting that but for venture capital investments, startups would rationally 
organize as “uncorporations” such as LLCs); Joseph Bankman, The Structure of 
Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1738–41, 1764–65 (1994) 
(contending that startups are organized as C corporations due to a “gambler’s 
mentality” on the part of the founders); Victor Fleischer, The Rational 
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 143–
80 (2003) (explaining that there are rational reasons why start-ups are 
organized as C corporations). 
 62. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: 
Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003) (breaking 
down venture capital financing); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling 
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2008) (outlining angel 
investor financing); Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1169 (elucidating venture debt financing). 
 63. See generally Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture 
Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006) (observing the 
unusual governance scheme in startups, with venture capitalists as preferred 
stockholders versus common shareholders who control other corporations). 
 64. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005) (describing venture capitalist strategies for exiting 
their portfolio startups). 
 65. Smith & Ueda, supra note 48, at 356. See Schellhardt, supra note 47 
(“Intrapreneurs often face giant stumbling blocks within hierarchical 
organizations, whose corporate cultures can serve to repel—not embrace—the 
entrepreneurial spirit.”). Clayton Christensen rightfully observes that many 
analyses of “organizational impediments” to intrapreneurship “stop with such 
simple rationales as bureaucracy, complacency, or ‘risk-averse’ culture,” 
although there are exceptions that go deeper. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra 
note 23, at 33–34. 
 66. See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on 
Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 82 
nn.62–65 (2008) (citing that the emerging “law and entrepreneurship” literature 
primarily focused on startups). There are exceptions of legal scholarship that 
discuss intrapreneurship. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: 
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B. Intrapreneurship’s Practical Importance 
The entrepreneurial startup backed by venture capital 
deserves its due attention. Fledgling startups become household 
names that employ thousands of people and bring us many of the 
technological innovations we hold dear.67 But the research labs 
inside large corporations (that have been large for some time) 
bring us many notable successes too, also employing thousands of 
people.68 While it may be difficult to quantify the amount of 
innovation that comes from R&D laboratories inside large 
corporations as opposed to startups, proxies can illuminate the 
comparison.69 
Patents are sometimes used as a measure of innovative 
activity.70 Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner note that 
the “major drivers of the recent increases in patenting activity 
are medium-to-large corporations” and that large corporations 
including “IBM, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard . . . have consistently 
ranked among the top patent recipients in recent years.”71 As one 
striking example, the authors note that “[s]ince 1994, IBM has 
                                                                                                     
The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial 
Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885 (2010) (considering the “dilemma faced by 
an established company in deciding whether to keep an employee’s innovation 
or allow the employee to pursue innovation through a startup”). 
 67. See Amanda Davis, How These Three Startups Became Household 
Names, INSTITUTE (Sept. 4, 2015), theinstitute.ieee.org/tech-history/technology-
history/how-these-three-startups-became-household-names (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016) (highlighting how “Microsoft, Sony, and Tata Consultancy Services found 
success through intrapreneurship, risk taking, and a bit of luck”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: 
ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 56 (2002) (“Routinized 
innovation is . . . of great and probably growing significance, as [evidenced] by 
the fact that the bulk of U.S. R&D is now channeled through [established] 
firms.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Chemmanur, Loutskina, & Tin, supra note 60, tbl.1 (reporting 
statistics that measure patents as a proxy for a firm’s innovation output). 
 70. See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Ariel Pakes & Bronyn H. Hall, The Value of 
Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity, in ECONOMIC POLICY & 
TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 97, 121 (Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman eds., 
1987) (“[P]atent data represents a valuable resource for the process of 
technological change.”); Chemmanur, Loutskina & Tin, supra note 60 (using 
patents as a proxy for a firm’s innovativeness). 
 71. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 7 n.12 (2005). 
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amassed over 25,000 U.S. patents, far more than any other 
company.”72 In a study examining the relationship between 
patents and firm size, John Allison and Mark Lemley empirically 
found that large corporations filed about 70% of issued patents in 
their sample, while small businesses filed only 11%.73 
Silicon Valley tech giants are leaders in intrapreneurship.74 
Amazon’s Amazon Web Services (AWS), an intrapreneurial 
project, has itself become a highly lucrative business.75 Google 
has an “innovation time off” program which allows employees to 
spend part of their workday on their own intrapreneurial ideas.76 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 46. 
 73. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An 
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 
(2000). The remaining balance was almost 18% filed by individuals and 1% filed 
by nonprofits. Id. 
 74. See George Deeb, Big Companies That Embrace Intrapreneurship Will 
Thrive, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/ 
243884 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (listing several examples of intrapreneurial 
successes within Silicon Valley tech companies) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 75. See Randy Bias, What is Amazon’s Secret for Success and Why Is EC2 a 
Runaway Train?, CLOUDSCALING (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.cloud 
scaling.com/blog/cloud-computing/what-is-amazons-secret-for-success-and-why-
is-ec2-a-runaway-train/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“AWS is staying on-track for 
100% year-over-year growth, revenues in the 1B range for 2011, and no end in 
sight to the high flying act.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Eugene Kim, This One Chart Gives You an Idea of How Crazy Amazon’s 
Cloud Growth Really Is, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 15, 2015, 3:56 PM), 
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-aws-growth-rate-is-far-outpacing-other-
enterprise-vendors-2015-12 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“AWS is seeing 78% 
year-on-year revenue growth, an astonishing growth rate compared to other 
large cap enterprise vendors on this list that had an average growth rate of a 
mere 6%.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76. See generally RYAN TATE, THE 20% DOCTRINE: HOW TINKERING, GOOFING 
OFF, AND BREAKING THE RULES AT WORK DRIVE SUCCESS IN BUSINESS (2012) 
(pointing out the difficulties that established companies have when dealing with 
disruptive technology). While reports suggest Google is no longer officially 
offering “20 Percent Time,” the company culture is such that employees continue 
to work on what they call “20 Percent Projects” even though they receive little to 
no institutional support. See Ryan Tate, Google Couldn’t Kill 20 Percent Time 
Even If It Wanted To, WIRED: BUS. (Aug. 21, 2013, 6:20 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/08/20-percent-time-will-never-die/ (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016) [hereinafter Tate, Google’s 20 Percent] (noting that even though 
Google has formally cancelled its “20 Percent Project” program, it still 
encourages its employees to pursue “20 Percent Projects”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Notably, half of the programs Google launched in the latter half 
of 2005 were developed through this program, including Gmail 
and Google News.77 Facebook and LinkedIn have their own 
permutations of the innovation-time-off rule.78  
Intrapreneurship is not only the province of the Silicon 
Valley tech companies, however. Internal employee collaboration 
created the Post-It Note at 3M79 and Lockheed Martin’s “Skunk 
Works” innovation team developed the U-2 spy plane.80 A junior 
employee at Sony developed the Playstation gaming console by 
tinkering with his daughter’s Nintendo.81 Though his immediate 
supervisors were not particularly amused, senior leaders saw the 
promise of the new creation and were open to innovation at a 
time before “intrapreneurship” was a developed principle.82 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Tate, Google’s 20 Percent, supra note 76 (“The policy [20% time] led 
to products like Google News; Google’s autocomplete system, originally called 
Google Suggest; Gmail, and AdSense . . . .”). 
 78. See id. (“[C]orporate hackathons [a cheaper version of 20% time] are 
now common place, including at Twitter, Facebook, Google, Yahoo, LinkedIn, 
and eBay . . . .”); see also Anis Bedda, Don’t Think Intrapreneurs Are Just Like 
Entrepreneurs—It’s Not True, INNOVATION, INTRAPRENEURSHIP CONFERENCE: 
BLOG, http://www.intrapreneurshipconference.com/dont-think-intrapreneurs-
are-just-like-entrepreneurs-its-not-true/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (sharing 
“four fundamental intra/entre-preneur disconnects for you to consider if you are 
serious about implementing intrapreneurship in your organization”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. See Dan Schawbel, Why Companies Want You to Become an 
Intrapreneur, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/danschawbel/2013/09/09/why-companies-want-you-to-become-an-intrapreneur/ 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“[A]t 3M, they came up with Post-It Notes . . . .”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Fry, supra note 47, at 5 
(describing 3M’s founders as innovative and noting that “3M is like a bunch of 
small companies pasted together”). 
 80. See The U-2 Dragon Lady, LOCKHEED MARTIN, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/100years/stories/u2.html (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016) (recounting how and why the U-2 Dragon Lady was created) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also ERIC RIES, THE LEAN 
STARTUP: HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE 
RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES 30–31 (2011) (noting that Intuit’s 
five-member intrapreneurial team created SnapTax). 
 81. See 10 Inspiring Examples of Successful Intrapreneurship, VOCOLI: 
BLOG (May 27, 2014), https://www.vocoli.com/blog/may-2014/10-inspiring-
examples-of-successful-intrapreneurship/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (presenting 
a synopsis of how PlayStation was created) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 82. See id. (discussing how “[m]any Sony Bosses were outraged at his 
work,” but a Sony employee in a senior position saw the promise of the Sony 
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Whirlpool—not exactly the first company one thinks of when it 
comes to innovation—enrolled every salaried employee in a 
business innovation course and trained specific employees to 
facilitate intrapreneurial projects.83 
C. Why Intrapreneurship Isn’t Even More Successful 
This Article is agnostic on the normative question of 
whether it is more desirable to see innovation pursued inside 
large corporations or through startups.84 But it is puzzling that 
intrapreneurship doesn’t completely dominate here.85 
Bankman and Gilson argue that theoretically we should never  
                                                                                                     
PlayStation). 
 83. See Jay Rao & Joseph Weintraub, How Innovative Is Your Company’s 
Culture, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.: RES. (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-innovative-is-your-companys-culture/ 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (detailing how Whirpool switched from an 
engineering and manufacturing oriented company to an innovation oriented 
company) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). By 2008, 1,100 of 
Whirlpool’s approximately 61,000 worldwide employees were “I-mentors,” who 
received specialized training to facilitate innovation projects among the 
employee base. Id. 
 84. From an aggregate social welfare perspective, we may not care if large 
corporations or startups are innovating—but the directors and shareholders of 
the large corporations do. See Minda Zetlin, Why Big Companies Suddenly Care 
About Small Companies and What You Should Do About It, INC (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/why-big-corporations-suddenly-care-about-
small-companies-and-what-you-should-do-.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) 
(“Across the nation, executives in boardrooms are thinking, worrying and 
talking about the new factor that’s changing everything in their world-the 
growth, innovation, and market power of small and start-up companies.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Also, given that retail investors 
are more likely to find themselves as shareholders of large corporations through 
retirement funds and the like (as opposed to the exclusive club of wealthy angel 
investors and venture capitalists that fund startups), there may be egalitarian 
issues here as well. See InvestorGuide Staff, What is the Difference Between 
Retail Investors and Institutional Investors?, INVESTORGUIDE, 
www.investorguide.com/article/ 11202/what-is-the-difference-between-retail-
investors-and-institutional-investors/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (discussing the 
different investments that a retail investor and an institutional investor will 
make) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, at 293 (arguing large employers 
have advantages in innovation compared to individual employees).  
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see startups.86 Instead, large corporations should be able to 
dominate innovation given their tax, information, and scope 
advantages.87 Further, the market should incentivize large 
corporations to innovate to stay relevant.88 
Still, intrapreneurship does not, on the whole, seem to be all 
roses. A recent article in the Harvard Business Review claims 
that intrapreneurial projects “fail between 70% and 90% of the 
time.”89 Christensen likewise notes that “most attempts to create 
successful new projects [inside a large corporation] fail.”90  
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. at 299 (“[W]e should not observe auctions [between large 
corporations and startups for an employee’s innovative idea], and we should not 
observe start-ups.”). 
 87. See id. at 293 (explaining that “[w]hen all else is equal, the employer 
has advantages—tax, information, and scope—that should result in it 
consistently winning the auction” to keep employees and their ideas in-house); 
see also Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors, supra note 4, at 730 (observing despite 
popular opinion, large established firms may be “more entrepreneurial and 
innovative than small firms” because they “have more resources to invest in 
innovation and to attract and incentivize entrepreneur-employees” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 88. See GIFFORD PINCHOT III, INTRAPRENEURING: WHY YOU DON’T HAVE TO 
LEAVE THE CORPORATION TO BECOME AN ENTREPRENEUR 7 (1985) (“The more 
rapidly American business learns to use the entrepreneurial talent inside large 
organizations, the better. The alternative in a time of rapid change is stagnation 
and decline.”); see also Henry Chesbrough, Graceful Exits and Missed 
Opportunities: Xerox’s Management of Its Technology Spin-off Organizations, 76 
BUS. HIST. REV. 803, 807 (2002) (noting that as early as 1969, Xerox’s head of 
research warned his company of falling the way of RCA, which “continued to 
invest in perfecting the vacuum tube and failed to invest in the transistor, which 
quickly rendered the vacuum tube obsolete”). 
 89. Beth Altringer, A New Model for Innovation in Big Companies, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/a-new-model-for-innovation-
in-big-companies/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also Susan Foley, 5 Reasons Why Intrapreneurship Is 
Important, CORP. ENTREPRENEURS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://corporate-entrepreneurs. 
com/blog1/2013/11/08/5-reasons-why-intrapreneurship-is-important/ (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (“Most studies report a 60%–70% failure rate when it comes to 
change initiatives. Risk adverse cultures and resistance to change impede an 
organizations [sic] ability to grow.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). This is not to say that the percentages are better for startups. See, e.g., 
Ibrahim, supra note 62, at 1176 (noting “the well-known fact that most start-ups 
fail” (footnotes omitted)).  
 90. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S 
SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 73 (2003) [hereinafter 
CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION] (“Over 60 percent of all 
new-product development efforts are scuttled before they ever reach the market. 
Of the 40 percent that do see the light of day, 40 percent fail to become 
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There are several explanations for why the 
entrepreneurship/intrapreneurship balance is often struck for the 
former. First, should a corporate employee come up with a 
disruptive innovation at work, it may be unclear whether she 
owns it or whether her employment agreement assigns property 
rights to the corporation. The employee is then faced with a 
dilemma of her own. On the one hand, she could pursue 
intrapreneurship, which means disclosing the innovation to her 
superiors and putting the ownership question front and center.91 
As an alternative, the employee can leave the corporation, form a 
startup, and probably have an easier claim to the innovation.92 
Therefore, it takes an innovative employer—one with an 
intrapreneurial mindset—to assure an employee that she will 
reap the rewards of disclosing her idea and staying in-house.93 
Second, an employer must commit to intrapreneurship in 
another way: compensation. Bankman and Gilson note that in 
large corporations, you risk “the perception of unfairness 
resulting from wide pay disparities.”94 Gilson nuances the issue 
further in another essay, arguing that intrapreneurial companies 
who financially reward innovative ideas get more employees to 
stay, but among themselves, employees will “hoard research to 
protect their property rights . . . .”95 This conundrum leads to the 
                                                                                                     
profitable and are withdrawn from the market.”); see also Altringer, supra note 
89 (“Studies show that efforts to stimulate intrapreneurship—entrepreneurship 
within an established company—more often than not fall flat.”). 
 91. See Gilson, supra note 20, at 896 (“A number of scholars have focused 
on the risk to the employee of merely disclosing the innovation; by doing so, the 
employee will compromise her intellectual property.”). 
 92. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and Employee Inventions 
(Berkeley Ctr. for L. & Tech., Working Paper No. 97-03, 1997) (arguing that, 
when the employee leaves the employer, employees have a better ownership 
claim on their innovations—free of an employer’s ownership claim—the earlier 
the innovation is in its development). 
 93. See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text (discussing Thermo 
Electron, a large corporation that created a new subsidiary for each 
intrapreneurial idea and gave the employee with the idea an entrepreneur-like 
ownership stake in the subsidiary). 
 94. Merges, supra note 92. 
 95. Gilson, supra note 20, at 899; see also Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, 
at 302 (citing Edward P. Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. 
ECON. 561, 562 (1989) (noting employees may sabotage each other’s efforts if the 
“prize” from having an intrapreneurial idea pursued is large enough)).  
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outcome that “[e]stablished technology companies both perform 
substantial amounts of innovation and lose employees to 
startups.”96  
Third, an employee gets a psychic reward from “going it 
alone” and becoming a successful entrepreneur that a large 
corporation may be unable to match.97 Recall the earlier 
discussion of the entrepreneur as the modern American hero.98 It 
is unclear whether an employee who innovates in-house would 
feel the same sense of personal accomplishment.99 On the other 
hand, for risk-averse employees who know that most startups 
fail, the compromise of being able to pursue an innovative idea 
while keeping a steady paycheck favors intrapreneurship.100 
Finally, I turn to the best-known and most influential theory 
on why intrapreneurship often fails: Clayton Christensen’s The 
Innovator’s Dilemma.101 Christensen counterintuitively argues 
that it is not stodgy old corporations resistant to change that get 
disrupted.102 Instead, he observes that “[c]orporate executives 
often bet the future of billion-dollar enterprises on an 
innovation,” citing IBM, DuPont, and Corning as examples.103 
Indeed, even though New Coke was a spectacular failure, the 
corporate employees who developed it were given raises and 
promotions.104 Christensen contends that it is actually well-run 
                                                                                                     
 96. Gilson, supra note 20, at 899. 
 97. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, at 305–06 (“Employees do not 
regard venture capital entrepreneurship as an identical substitute for continued 
employment. Employees have different utility functions . . . .”). 
 98. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text (discussing the 
glorification of entrepreneurs). 
 99. See id. at 306 (“[A]n employee may positively value the opportunity to 
be her own boss, as well as the favorable cultural image of an entrepreneur.”). 
 100. See id. (discussing an employee’s risk calculus and considerations). 
 101. While Christensen made the problems with large corporations 
innovating famous, other commentators had made similar observations. See, 
e.g., Rebecca Henderson, Underinvestment and Incompetence as Responses to 
Radical Innovation: Evidence from the Photolithographic Alignment Equipment 
Industry, 24 RAND J. ECON. 248, 251, 267–68 (1993) (contending that large 
corporations focus on incremental improvements while startups are more likely 
to engage in radical innovation). 
 102. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, supra note 90, 
at 2–3 (discussing corporations insistent on focusing on their core business). 
 103. Id. at 7. 
 104. See Bedda, supra note 78 (“Even though the product was a complete 
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organizations that fail at intrapreneurship.105 For starters, 
Christensen distinguishes between two types of possible 
innovations: sustaining and disruptive. Sustaining innovations 
are improvements on a corporation’s existing products that are 
already popular with its customers,106 while disruptive 
innovations are truly revolutionary ideas that create new 
markets and new customers.107 For example, a “new and 
improved” Crest toothpaste is a sustaining innovation, whereas 
Crest white strips are a disruptive innovation.108 
Unlike Proctor & Gamble’s success with Crest, Christensen 
argues that most large corporations only offer the “new and 
improved” sustaining innovation.109 Why? As Christensen 
explains: “good management itself was the root cause [of failing to 
consider disruptive innovations]. Managers played the game the 
way it was supposed to be played . . . listening carefully to 
customers . . . and investing resources to design and build higher-
                                                                                                     
flop, the guys who invented New Coke, were given raises and promotions 
instead of being canned.”). 
 105. See THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at xv (showing that “in 
the cases of well-managed firms such as those cited above, good management 
was the most powerful reason they failed to stay atop their industries”). 
 106. See id. at xviii (“What all sustaining technologies have in common is 
that they improve the performance of established products . . . .”); id. (“Most 
technological advances in a given industry are sustaining in character.”). 
 107. See id. (noting disruptive innovations “result in worse product 
performance, at least in the near-term”). 
 108. See Robert D. Hof, Innovate or Die, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2003), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2003-10-05/innovate-or-die (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (“Procter & Gamble Co . . . . does more than simply offer ‘new and 
improved’ toothpaste. In 2001, it launched Crest Whitestrips, a home tooth-
whitening product that created a new market . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Similarly, Wal-Mart and Kmart were 
disruptive innovations to high-end department stores in the 1960s. See 
CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, supra note 90, at 46 (“In 
the 1960s, discount retailers such as Wal-Mart and Kmart attacked the low end 
of department stores’ market—nationally branded hard goods such as paint, 
hardware, kitchen utensils, toys, and sporting goods—that were so familiar in 
use that they could sell themselves.”). There are also “hybrid” disruptors such as 
Charles Schwab, which “stole some customers from full-service brokers with its 
discounted trading fees, but it also created new markets by enabling people who 
historically were not equity investors—such as students—to begin owning and 
trading stocks.” Id. at 47. 
 109. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, supra note 90, 
at 40–41 (discussing the use of sustaining inventions by companies). 
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performance [and] higher-quality products . . . .”110 Conversely, 
disruptive innovations often start downstream, chasing new 
customers in less-desirable, less-profitable markets.111  
Asymmetries that exist within large corporations cause the 
innovator’s dilemma. First, well-run corporations suffer from 
asymmetric motivation, meaning they have “value networks” that 
prioritize the needs of their largest customers.112 Therefore, large 
corporations do not have the motivation to invest in technologies 
that will move them downstream into less desirable markets.113 
Per Christensen: “Disruptive innovations are complex because 
their value and application are uncertain, according to the 
criteria used by incumbent firms.”114 Therefore, managers—
especially the important middle managers (discussed below)—
will play it safe and pursue non-risky projects with more certain 
payment streams.115 
Second, large corporations also suffer from the problem of 
asymmetric information—i.e., disparities in who knows what 
inside the corporation. Skilled employees such as engineers may 
well see disruption coming, and have their own ideas for 
responding to it, but those ideas do not make their way up the 
food chain.116 Christensen argues that “while senior managers 
                                                                                                     
 110. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 112; see also Gilson, supra 
note 20, at 905 (“[T]he problem arises precisely because the industry leaders are 
so good at what they do.”); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and 
Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 588 (2003) (“[C]ompanies 
get locked in to a particular value network, so that they are not able to innovate 
radically after establishing a platform standard.”). 
 111. See THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at xx (“By and large, a 
disruptive technology is initially embraced by the least profitable customers in a 
market. Hence most [large corporations]. . . are rarely able to build a case for 
investing in disruptive technologies until it is too late.”). 
 112. Id. at 36 (“The concept of the value network—the context within which 
a firm identifies and responds to customers’ needs, solves problems, procures 
input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit—is central to this synthesis.”). 
 113. See id. at 89 (discussing how “leading companies migrate so readily 
toward high-end markets” but “moving downmarket” does not easily occur); id. 
at 61 (“[I]ncumbent firms are likely to lag in the development of technologies—
even those in which the technology involved is intrinsically simple—that only 
address customers’ needs in emerging value networks.”). 
 114. Id. at 61. 
 115. See id. at 112 (discussing managers’ resource allocation logic). 
 116. This may not always be true, as R&D departments may not anticipate 
competitive threats. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 45 (“Traditional R&D doesn’t 
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may think they’re making the resource allocation decisions, many 
of the really critical resource allocation decisions have actually 
been made long before senior management gets involved . . . .”117 
Middle managers are actually the key players, and their 
incentives favor sustaining, not disruptive, innovations.118  
As Christensen notes: “Middle managers aren’t penalized for 
all failures . . . [b]ut projects that fail because the market wasn’t 
there have far more serious implications for managers’ 
careers.”119 Therefore, middle managers are likely to reject an 
employee’s disruptive innovations, which by definition have 
uncertain markets, and instead promote sustaining innovations 
whose known markets are the corporations’ current customers.120 
Thus, while Bankman and Gilson argue that large corporations 
know more about a current employee’s disruptive idea than a 
venture capitalist will (the “informational” advantage), the senior 
management at the corporation might not.121 
Christensen’s work, and the buzz around “disruption,” was 
immediately bought into without much challenge—that is until 
Harvard history professor Jill Lepore penned The Disruption 
Machine in a 2014 issue of the New Yorker.122 Lepore observed: 
                                                                                                     
do a good job of sniffing out competitive threats. More and more, corporate R&D 
units tend to focus on a narrow range of projects, thus potentially neglecting 
disruptive advances that occur outside the company.”). An aside: although I 
generally link them throughout this Article, risks from disruptive threats 
outside the corporation and employee opportunities for responding to those risks 
are distinguishable and may require more nuanced thought on how the 
difference affects my analysis.  
 117. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 95. 
 118. See id. (“Middle managers have made their decisions about which 
projects they’ll back and carry to senior management—and which they will 
allow to languish.”). 
 119. Id.  
 120. See id. at 119 (observing that managers who choose to pitch disruptive 
innovations “essentially are picking a fight with a powerful tendency of 
organizational nature—that customers, not managers, essentially control the 
investment patterns of a company”); CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S 
SOLUTION, supra note 90, at 10 (“Middle managers typically hesitate to throw 
their weight behind new product concepts whose market is not assured. If a 
market fails to materialize, the company will have wasted millions of dollars.”). 
 121. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, at 295–97 (discussing how large 
companies have better information than VCs both as to the employee generally 
and to her innovation). 
 122. Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation 
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“Most big ideas have loud critics. Not disruption.”123 Lepore 
changed that, and others have followed.124 
The critiques generally fall into two categories. First, Lepore 
claimed that Christensen’s case studies in The Innovator’s 
Dilemma do not actually support his theories.125 Others have 
made similar claims, perhaps most significantly, Dartmouth 
business school professor Andrew King and graduate student 
Baljir Baatartogtokh.126 Christensen has hit back at his critics, 
noting that matters of disruption happen differently in different 
industries, and that his theories continue to evolve (as addressed 
                                                                                                     
Gets Wrong, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/ 06/23/the-disruption-machine (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 123. Id. 
124. See infra notes 125–131 (discussing the range of criticism). 
 125. For example, on the disk-drive industry case studies, Lepore argues: 
“Most of the entrant firms celebrated by Christensen as triumphant 
disrupters . . . no longer exist, their success having been in some cases brief and 
in others illusory.” See Lepore, supra note 122. She then goes further by stating 
that, in the long term 
victory in the disk-drive industry appears to have gone to the 
manufacturers that were good at incremental improvements, whether 
or not they were the first to market the disruptive new format. 
Companies that were quick to release a new product but not skilled at 
tinkering have tended to flame out.  
Id. On the mechanical excavation case studies, Lepore states that Christensen 
counted thirty established companies in the 1950s but stated that only four 
survived the entrance of thirteen so-called “disruptive newcomers” by the 1970s. 
Id. However, Lepore points out that many of these newcomers had been in the 
industry for years. Id. In particular, O&K was founded in 1876 and made cable-
operated shovels since 1908; Demag had been building excavators since 1925; 
and Hitachi, founded in 1910, sold cable-operated shovels before World War II. 
Id. Lepore reports that Christensen also focused heavily on Bucyrus and stated 
that its profits began to decline due to the disruptive hydraulics technology in 
the industry. Id. However, Lepore points out that Bucyrus’s profits grew twenty-
five-fold between 1962 and 1979 and was purchased by Caterpillar in 2011 for 
$9 billion. Id. 
 126. See Andrew A. King & Baljir Baatartogtokh, How Useful Is the Theory 
of Disruptive Innovation?, 57 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 77, 78 (2015) (summarizing 
their view of Christensen’s theories, attempting to determine whether 
seventy-seven of Christensen’s own examples conformed to his theories (as they 
understood them), and finding that only seven of the examples (or 9%) fit the 
four criteria they attribute to Christensen). 
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in subsequent work) but are still fundamentally correct as 
originally set forth.127  
A second critique is how broadly Christensen’s theory has 
been applied.128 Some examples of areas ripe for disruption are 
museums, hospitals, schools, universities, journalism, and 
politics. But these areas involve different constituencies and 
considerations than business.129 Christensen himself is to blame 
for some of the disruption overuse, as he has penned books 
applying disruption to other areas130 while simultaneously 
hesitating at how broadly his theory is being applied.131 
                                                                                                     
 127. Drake Bennett, Clayton Christensen Responds to New Yorker 
Takedown of ‘Disruptive Innovation,’ BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June. 21, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-20/clayton-christensen-responds-
to-new-yorker-takedown-of-disruptive-innovation (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In response to King and 
Baatartogtokh, Christensen argues that “the rigor of their research was greatly 
lacking,” and “doesn’t demonstrate a thorough understanding of how disruption 
plays out in different industries.” Jay Fitzgerald, ‘Disruptive Innovation’ Theory 
Comes Under Scrutiny, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www. 
bostonglobe.com/business/2015/10/23/disruption-economic-theory-faces-detractors/ 
ZruX6qvCjNb7Eh5XdujPLI/story.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. See Haydn Shaughnessy, What Did the Innovator’s Dilemma Get 
Wrong?, FORBES: (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/haydnshaughnessy/2014 /06/27/what-did-
innovators-dilemma-get-wrong/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (supporting Lepore’s 
article because it challenges the business elite as having too much power in 
shaping intellectual discussions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 129. See Dave Beal, Disrupting ‘Disruption’: Skepticism Grows about One of 
Business’s Biggest Ideas, MINNPOST (Nov. 19, 2015) https://www.minnpost.com/ 
business/2015/11/disrupting-disruption-skepticism-grows-about-one-businesss-
biggest-ideas (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (explaining that employing disruption 
beyond business is “typically more complicated because they have direct 
stakeholders beyond primary shareholders. For example, public schools have to 
deal with administrators, teachers, students and parents”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130. See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A 
DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE xix–xx (2009) (relating to the health 
care industry); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & HENRY J. EYRING, THE INNOVATIVE 
UNIVERSITY: CHANGING THE DNA OF HIGHER EDUCATION FROM THE INSIDE OUT 
XXIV–XXV (2011) (relating to higher education).  
 131. See King & Baartartogtokh, supra note 126, at 78 (discussing 
Christensen’s “theory, or variations thereof, has been used in so many settings 
that Christensen himself has expressed unease with some of the ways the 
theory is being applied”); Globe Staff, Clay Christensen Explains, Defends 
‘Disruptive Innovation,’ BOS. GLOBE (Oct 25, 2015), 
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First, I cannot say whether Christensen or his critics are 
correct on the empirics of disruption. However, I am more 
concerned with certain parts of his work, namely the asymmetries 
he identifies within large corporations. In short, I am more 
interested in Christensen’s identification of structures/institutional 
roadblocks to large corporations pursuing disruptive innovations 
than his case studies. As to the overuse critique, intrapreneurship 
(my focus) sits squarely in the business world, Christensen’s 
original battle sphere, so whether it applies elsewhere is irrelevant 
to my project. Thus, for my purposes, the triumphs of the 
innovator’s dilemma still trump the critiques. 
III. Solving the Innovator’s Dilemma 
So that, in a nutshell, is the innovator’s dilemma. Well-
managed corporations do not pursue significant, disruptive 
innovations—instead leaving them to startups—because their 
value networks are built around serving existing customers 
through safer sustaining innovations. Yet ultimately in the 
examples Christensen identifies in his book, “it was disruptive 
technology that precipitated the leading firms’ failure.”132 Thus, if 
large corporations are to survive, they must engage in disruptive 
innovation in some form or another. The remainder of the Article 
is devoted to two possible approaches: 1) large corporations 
getting better at pursuing disruptive innovations in-house; or 
2), large corporations continuing to mostly pursue sustaining 
innovations in-house, but establishing venture arms to fund 
startups (so-called “corporate venture capital”).133 
This Part and Part IV focus on improving efforts at 
intrapreneurship, both from an organizational and business 
perspective and by detouring into corporate law.134 Part V 
                                                                                                     
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ business/2015/10/24/clay-christensen-explains-
defends-disruptive-innovation /fmYOKIJXOSPPMquj8HQM1O/story.html 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“The word disruption has many connotations in the 
English language. I just didn’t realize how that would create such a wide 
misapplication of the word ‘disruption’ into things that I never meant it to be 
applied to.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at xviii. 
 133. Infra Parts IV–V.  
 134. Infra Parts III–IV. 
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examines corporate venture capital as a possible win-win hybrid 
approach between entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship.135 
A. Christensen’s Answer 
How do corporations overcome the innovator’s dilemma and 
improve at intrapreneurship? In his follow-up book The 
Innovator’s Solution, Christensen revisits the two asymmetry 
problems identified in The Innovator’s Dilemma and offers some 
solutions.136  
First, to overcome the myopic focus on high-end customers 
(the asymmetric motivation problem), Christensen proposes that 
corporations “set up an autonomous organization charged with 
building a new and independent business around the disruptive 
technology.”137 He notes that successful intrapreneurial 
corporations have “placed projects to develop disruptive 
technologies in organizations small enough to get excited about 
small opportunities and small wins.”138 Numerous examples in 
his book reveal how a new organizational unit is not hamstrung 
by the existing value networks of the corporation.139 Bankman 
                                                                                                     
 135. Infra Part V.  
 136. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, supra note 90, 
at 268–71 (discussing the role of managers in promoting intrapreneurship). 
 137. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at xxiv; see also Roland Bel, 
Innovation: Misconceptions, Trends, and Directions, 32 GLOBAL BUS. & 
ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE 71, 79 (2013) (describing 3M’s intrapreneurial 
incentives and noting that “if the new product achieves a certain level of 
success, a business unit is created and the product champion is given the 
opportunity to head it, a very prestigious position”). 
 138. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 23, at 114; see also Gilson, supra 
note 20, at 906–07 (“Christensen recommends that the established company 
hedge the potential that a technology is disruptive by creating a separate 
unit . . . . If the technology ultimately proves disruptive, the established 
company has the resources to grow the small separate unit quickly.”). 
 139. See Gilson, supra note 20, at 121 (noting Quantum financed and held 
80% ownership in a spin-off to develop a new disk drive that was housed in a 
separate location and “was a completely self-sufficient organization”); id. at 127 
(observing IBM succeeded at the beginning of the personal computing industry 
because it “created an autonomous organization in Florida, far away from its 
New York state headquarters” that had complete freedom of operation); id. at 
134 (“HP created a completely autonomous organizational unit, located in 
Vancouver, Washington, with responsibility for making the ink-jet printer a 
success.”). 
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and Gilson likewise point to the intrapreneurial corporation 
Thermo Electron, which “appears to exemplify the employer who 
never loses an auction of an employee’s innovation to a venture 
capitalist.”140 Thermo Electron creates new subsidiaries each 
time an employee comes up with a viable idea for a business, 
and the employee gets “an entrepreneur’s equity stake in the 
venture.”141 
Second, regarding ideas from below not reaching top 
management (the asymmetric information problem), 
Christensen argues that disruptive ideas must be allowed to 
percolate up the food chain instead of being killed at the middle-
manager level.142 His thoughts on how to accomplish this mostly 
consist of vague statements such as: “senior executives need to 
stand astride the interface between sustaining innovations and 
disruption,” and “managers of the mainstream business units 
need to be fully informed of the technological and business 
model innovations that are developed” elsewhere in the 
corporation.143 In Part IV, I offer some thoughts on how 
corporate law can help disruptive ideas better flow up the 
organizational ladder. 
Christensen’s work is richer than I have summarized, but 
this one-two goal of senior management learning about 
disruptive innovations, then pursuing them in independent 
units is at the core of the innovator’s solution.144 Note that this 
is not a full-on shift to pursuing disruptive over-sustaining 
innovations, but a nimble balance between the two, such as 
Crest struck with improved toothpaste and white strips.145 On 
the one hand, the corporation focuses on its core business and 
sustaining innovations, while small units within the corporation 
                                                                                                     
 140. Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, at 299. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, supra note 90, 
at 270 (observing that middle managers often only send information to senior 
management that will win senior management’s approval).  
 143. Id. at 271. 
 144. See id. at 268 (indicating that the development of a disruptive growth 
engine will place a company on a path to profitability). 
 145. See id. at 271 (determining that to develop a successful disruptive 
growth engine, managers must learn about both the sustaining and disruptive 
sides of the interface). 
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pursue riskier, disruptive innovations.146 This nimbleness is what 
Ronald Gilson has termed “organizational ambidexterity.”147 
B. Borrowing from Entrepreneurship: What Makes a Good 
Entrepreneur? 
Interestingly, an examination of the entrepreneurship literature 
reveals themes similar to those discussed above.148 In short, 
successful entrepreneurs are both superior risk takers and superior 
risk identifiers. 
First, harkening back to the days of Frank Knight, scholars have 
long thought of entrepreneurs as risk takers.149 This personality trait 
of entrepreneurs is academically-termed ‘risk tolerance’ and aligns 
with the general human intuition of why entrepreneurs are 
successful—colloquially, they are more likely to “stick their neck 
out.”150 On the other hand, Robert Brockhaus compared 
                                                                                                     
 146. See id. at 280 (directing that implementing a disruptive growth engine 
requires appointing senior managers who monitor resource allocation and 
creating an expert team of innovators). 
 147. See Gilson, supra note 20, at 891 (“Can the same organization and 
financing arrangements successfully support development of the dominant 
technology while simultaneously supporting development of the technology that 
will supplant [it] . . . ?”). 
 148. See generally CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION, 
supra note 90; infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing entrepreneurs’ 
trait of “risk tolerance”). 
 149. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 41 (1921) 
(describing risk-taking as the essential function of an entrepreneur); see also 
Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for 
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981) (positing that 
managers in large corporations are risk averse); Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. 
Barney, Differences Between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large 
Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 9, 10 (1997) (citing prior academic work describing academics as 
“risk-takers and rugged individualists” and “as being a ‘breed apart’” (citations 
omitted)); William I. Norton, Jr. & William T. Moore, The Influence of 
Entrepreneurial Risk Assessment on Venture Launch or Growth Decisions, 26 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 215, 215 (2006) [hereinafter Entrepreneurial Risk 
Assessment] (“There is a broadly held perception that entrepreneurs engage in 
risky behavior . . . [and that this] suggests differential predispositions and 
actions across entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs.”). 
 150. See William I. Norton, Jr. & William T. Moore, Entrepreneurial Risk: 
Have We Been Asking the Wrong Question?, 18 SMALL BUS. ECON. 281, 281 
(2002) (discussing long-held notions about an entrepreneur’s superior risk 
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entrepreneurs and corporate managers and found no significant 
differences in terms of their risk tolerance.151 Brockhaus’s study 
found that “the level of risk taking propensity does not distinguish 
new entrepreneurs either from managers or from the general 
population[,]” as all were deemed ‘moderate’ risk takers.152 Follow-up 
work has echoed this claim.153  
Certainly the conventional wisdom holds—risk taking is at the 
heart of the entrepreneurial enterprise. But scholars have also now 
identified entrepreneurs as superior risk identifiers.154 This shift in 
thought moves away from how much risk an entrepreneur took and 
towards entrepreneurs’ versus others’ assessment of new projects.155 
William Norton and William Moore have published a number of 
articles that hypothesize, and to a certain degree aim to empirically 
test, that while “[e]ntrepreneurs will not differ significantly in risk 
taking propensity from nonentrepreneurs . . . . [e]ntrepreneurs will 
                                                                                                     
tolerance); Ruth Simon, Endangered Species: Young U.S. Entrepreneurs: New 
Data Underscore Financial Challenges and Low Tolerance for Risk Among 
Young Americans, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
endangered-species-young-u-s-entrepreneurs-1420246116 (last visited on Dec. 
15, 2016) (“The share of people under age 30 who own private businesses has 
reached a 24-year-low, according to new data, underscoring financial challenges 
and a low tolerance for risk among young Americans.” (emphasis added)) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Steve Strauss, Can 
Entrepreneurs Avoid Risk? A: No Way, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ columnist/strauss/2015/10/27/strauss-
small-business-risk/74683398/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“Risk is part of the 
game and if you want to start a business, you simply have to be risk-tolerant.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Neil Patel, The 
Entrepreneur’s 8-Step Checklist For Taking A Business Risk, FORBES (Aug. 14, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilpatel/2015/ 08/14/the-entrepreneurs-8-
step-checklist-for-taking-a-business-risk/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (explaining 
that entrepreneurial success is the result of “pure chance, hard work, and 
taking risks”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 151. See Robert H. Brockhaus, Sr., Risk Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs, 
23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 509, 519 (1980) (deducing that there was no significant 
difference in risk propensity between entrepreneurs and managers). 
 152. Id. at 518–19.  
 153. See Busenitz & Barney, supra note 148, at 11 (“[I]t is now often 
concluded that most of the psychological differences between entrepreneurs and 
managers in large organizations are small or nonexistent.”). 
 154. See Norton & Moore, supra note 149, at 222 (concluding that 
entrepreneurs assess risk more favorably). 
 155. See PATRICK R. LILES, NEW BUSINESS VENTURES AND THE ENTREPRENEUR 
13 (1974) (discussing the “potential entrepreneur’s perception of the risk 
involved” (emphasis added)).  
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assess venture opportunities more favorably than 
nonentrepreneurs.”156 More specifically, they argue that 
“entrepreneurs do not necessarily possess character traits which 
predispose them to engage in behavior with widely variable outcomes, 
but rather that entrepreneurs assess opportunities differently than 
non-entrepreneurs.”157  
This is primarily because of an entrepreneur’s prior 
experiences.158 Lowell Busenitz and Jay Barney give more context to 
this argument, finding that entrepreneurs are more willing to 
generalize from past experiences than corporate managers.159 These 
traits lead to different ways in which entrepreneurs and corporate 
managers “perceive and think about risk.”160 Even Malcolm Gladwell 
has picked up on these ideas, writing: “The risk-taking model 
suggests that the entrepreneur’s chief advantage is one of 
temperament—he’s braver than the rest of us are. In the [new] 
model, the entrepreneur’s advantage is analytical—he’s better at 
figuring out a sure thing than the rest of us.”161  
IV. Intrapreneurship and Corporate Law 
Having laid out the asymmetry problems inside large 
corporations that hinder intrapreneurship, and having observed that 
successful entrepreneurs overcome these problems, my attention 
turns to what limited role corporate law might play here.162 Limited 
                                                                                                     
 156. Norton & Moore, supra note 149, at 218.  
 157. Norton & Moore, supra note 150, at 281.   
 158. See id. at 281, 285 (labeling an entrepreneur’s past experiences as 
“personal prior information”). 
 159. See Busenitz & Barney, supra note 149, at 25 (concluding that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to use biases and heuristics in their decision-
making). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Malcolm Gladwell, The Sure Thing, NEW YORKER (Jan. 18, 2010) 
http://gladwell.com/the-sure-thing (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Law 
as Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 J. L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 153, 172–74 (2010) (determining that entrepreneurs 
succeed either because they have better information than others or assess the 
same information in a superior manner). 
 162. Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 19, at 1539 (“[A] legal system can 
facilitate the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities by emboldening 
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liability and bankruptcy laws play a well-known role in encouraging 
entrepreneurship. What about law and intrapreneurship? I reveal 
below that the business judgment rule and the duty to monitor—two 
important corporate law doctrines—reduce asymmetry problems in 
large corporations and thus encourage intrapreneurship. 
A. Risk Taking and the Business Judgment Rule 
The corporate law doctrine that encourages management to take 
risks in the face of uncertainty, such as pursuing disruptive 
innovations, is the business judgment rule. The business judgment 
rule, corporate law’s defining doctrine,163 insulates management 
(most notably boards of directors) from personal liability for honest 
business decisions that turn out poorly.164 There are many proffered 
rationales for the business judgment rule165—the one I focus on is 
encouraging risk-taking.166 
                                                                                                     
entrepreneurs to act.”); see also Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and 
What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 850 (2007) 
(discussing how the law is a powerful tool for impacting entrepreneurial 
activity). 
 163. See Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 83 (“The business judgment rule 
pervades every aspect of state corporate law, from the review of allegedly 
negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions 
to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.”).  
 164. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that the 
business judgment rule is a presumption that the directors “acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company”); see also Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V, 453 
B.R. 645, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (“Under Delaware law, the business decisions of 
a company’s directors or officers are insulated from court review by the business 
judgment rule . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 165. The other main rationales beyond encouraging directors to take risks 
are that judges are not business experts and that we should encourage outside 
directors to serve on boards. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); Kamin v. Am. Express 
Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–11 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (App. Div. 1976) (“The directors’ 
room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out 
purely business question . . . .”); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with 
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a 
Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 449 (2002) (“Highly 
qualified directors may also avoid service if they face liability risks that are 
disproportionate to the benefits of service.”).  
 166. See Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to 
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The basic economic calculus for shareholders and directors 
differs when it comes to taking significant risks. As Stephen 
Bainbridge outlined, the shareholders of large corporations “will 
have a high tolerance for risky corporate projects” for two 
reasons.167 First, under corporate law, shareholders enjoy limited 
liability, meaning that if a risky project fails, the shareholders 
only suffer that loss to the extent of their capital investment—
their personal fortune is not at risk.168 Second, shareholders in 
large corporations tend to also be shareholders in other large 
corporations; i.e., they hold a diversified portfolio of 
investments.169 Thus, risky projects that fail for one corporation 
can be offset by risky projects that succeed in another.170 
The directors’ economics are much different. Directors cannot 
diversify their human capital to the extent that shareholders can 
diversify their financial capital.171 There are only so many boards 
on which a director can sit and adequately do her job; thus, 
directors make firm-specific human capital investments.172 Also, 
while directors earn compensation from the corporations they 
serve, both through salary and stock options, theirs is a relatively 
small ownership percentage in the corporation. Thus, without the 
business judgment rule, if directors take on a risky project, they 
                                                                                                     
Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
21, 41 (1994) (“The policy underlying the [business judgment] rule encourages 
risk taking, innovation, and creative entrepreneurial activities.”); Michael C. 
Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners 
Associations and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 875 
(2013) (“The business judgment rule is a means of incentivizing innovation and 
risk-taking in the development of new products and business methods.”). 
 167. Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 111. 
 168. See id. (“Because shareholders thus do not put their personal assets at 
jeopardy, other than the amount initially invested, they effectively externalize 
some portion of the business’ total risk exposure to creditors.”). 
 169. See id. at 112 (“[S]hareholders can largely eliminate firm-specific risk 
by holding a diversified portfolio . . . .”). 
 170. See id. (citing that shareholders of large corporations tend to diversify 
to account for risk). 
 171. See id. at 113 (“[M]anagers obviously cannot diversify their human 
capital among a number of other firms.”). 
 172. See id. (“Corporate managers typically have substantial firm-specific 
capital.”). 
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enjoy only a limited upside if it succeeds, but face a significant 
downside if it fails.173 
By encouraging directors to take risks that shareholders 
would want, the business judgment rule aligns director-
shareholder interests.174 As Chancellor Allen colorfully put it, to 
allow directors to be liable for risky projects gone bad where “the 
investment was too risky (foolishly risky! stupidly risky! 
egregiously risky!)—you supply the adverb[,]” would “be very 
destructive of shareholder welfare in the long-term.”175  
Thus, perhaps an important reason why previous 
entrepreneurial studies have found little difference in risk-taking 
appetites among managers in large corporations and 
entrepreneurs in startups is because corporate law evens the 
playing field.176 It permits management who might otherwise be 
disinclined to pursue risky projects to do so without the fear of 
personal liability.177 In sum, the risk-taking encouraged by the 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (determining that without the business judgment rule, there would be 
“this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors”). 
 174.  
The [business judgment] rule could rationally be no 
different . . . . Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) 
directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests, 
across the full range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be 
maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk 
and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted 
returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.  
Id. 
 175. Id. at 1052–53. This position is not without its critics. Writing after the 
Financial Crisis of 2008, David Rosenberg argues that the “widely accepted 
notion that the business judgment rule should protect virtually all risk-taking 
by corporate directors goes too far.” David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The 
Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 216, 220 (2009); see also Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk 
Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159, 160 (2010) (proposing a nuanced approach on 
the idea of financial risk-taking). 
 176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (citing the business 
judgment rule as a corporate law structure in which risk taking among 
managers is evaluated similarly to risk taking of entrepreneurs). 
 177. According to Charles O’Kelley, Frank Knight’s seminal work, Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Profit, anticipated this connection to some extent. See Charles 
R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141, 1148 
(2010) (discussing FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (2009)). 
The article explains: “Knight believed that a proper understanding of the nature 
of business judgment would lead to a discovery that the modern corporation was 
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business judgment rule can help reduce the asymmetric 
motivation problem inside large corporations.178 To pursue both 
sustaining and disruptive innovations simultaneously, 
management can establish a new organizational unit within the 
corporation or form a new corporate subsidiary to house the 
intrapreneurial project.179 Both decisions would be protected by 
the business judgment rule. 
B. Risk Identification and the Duty to Monitor 
Next I turn to the other asymmetry that lies at the heart of 
the innovator’s dilemma: the asymmetric information problem. 
That is, senior management (including the board of directors) not 
learning of disruptive employee innovations hatched below 
them.180 
1. The Modern Duty to Monitor 
The corporate law doctrine that most aptly speaks to risk 
identification is the duty to monitor.181 The modern formulation 
of the duty to monitor was first set forth in 1996 by the Delaware 
                                                                                                     
actually managed and controlled by an approximation of the classic 
entrepreneur.” Id. See also id. at 1149 (noting the “apparent separation of the 
functions of making decisions and taking the ‘risk’ of error in decisions” inside 
the corporation). 
 178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (arguing that the business 
judgment rule gives managers within a corporation more leeway to utilize 
disruptive ideas). 
 179. See Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate 
Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1048 (2007) (“[L]arge, bureaucratic organizations 
sometimes develop ‘skunkworks’: small, subversive units within a larger 
organization charged with developing technological innovation.”). 
 180. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, supra note 90 (citing that middle 
management often censors information that it sends to upper management).  
 181. A preliminary note: the entrepreneurship literature often conflates or 
uses interchangeably risk identification and risk assessment, which are actually 
two different notions. The duty to monitor might help directors identify risks, 
but legal doctrine does not speak to how directors bring to bear their 
experiences and judgments in assessing those risks. See In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (setting forth the modern formulation of 
the duty to monitor). 
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Chancery Court in In Re Caremark.182 Caremark rejected prior 
notions that directors were only required to monitor employees if 
“red flags” existed, and instead made instituting a monitoring 
system a mandatory requirement.183 Through this 
pronouncement, Chancellor Allen recognized that most activity 
within a large corporation happens below the board level and 
sought to increase the board’s awareness of subordinate action.184 
The Caremark decision led commentators to speculate that 
the new duty to monitor would be a significant change in 
directors’ duties under Delaware law.185 Yet, Caremark itself had 
limited reach for several reasons. First, it was a settlement 
opinion, and thus largely dicta.186 Second, although the Delaware 
Supreme Court later disputed this, at the time it was fairly 
obvious that the duty to monitor was treated as a subset of the 
duty of care, and thus subject to exculpation under DGCL Section 
102(b)(7).187 Further, even without exculpation, the duty did not 
seem difficult to satisfy, as a good faith attempt at a monitoring 
system was sufficient and the details of the system were left to 
the directors’ business judgment.188 
                                                                                                     
 182. See id. (setting forth the modern formulation of the duty to monitor). 
 183. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) 
(observing that middle managers often only send information to senior 
management that will win senior management’s approval and that “absent 
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing”). 
 184. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing the Efficiency of Board Decision 
Making: Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
813, 847 (2009) (“In Caremark, Chancellor Allen explained that he wanted a 
board to be more actively involved in company oversight and monitoring.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 719, 719–20 (2007) (“[F]ormer Chancellor Allen’s opinion In Re 
Caremark International Derivative Litigation is destined to be one of the most 
prominent Delaware opinions of all time.”). 
 186. See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d at 960 (assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the respective claims to evaluate the fairness of the 
settlement agreement at issue). 
 187. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015) (allowing corporations 
to preemptively absolve directors of personal liability for violating the duty of 
care). 
 188. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] 
director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for losses caused by 
non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”). 
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Caremark’s progeny have had more reach. Most notably, 
Stone v. Ritter189 presented the Delaware Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to examine “a classic Caremark case.”190 In Stone, as 
in Caremark, illegal conduct by corporate employees led to the 
U.S. government imposing a fine on the corporation.191 The 
shareholders sued to have the directors repay the fine to the 
corporate treasury.192 The Stone Court affirmed the Caremark 
monitoring standard but with two changes.193 First, the Court 
proclaimed that the fiduciary duty being breached by not 
monitoring was good faith, a subset of loyalty, to which neither 
102(b)(7) or the business judgment rule apply.194 Second, the 
Court clarified that the directors must not only install a 
monitoring system, they must use it.195 For instance, a board 
cannot employ a compliance officer and never hear from her 
claiming that never receiving a report is a matter of business 
judgment.196  
Still, only an “utter failure” to monitor results in liability, 
and the duty to monitor only requires monitoring for certain 
actions—namely, illegal activity specific to the corporation’s 
                                                                                                     
 189. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 190. Id. at 364. 
 191. See id. at 365 (determining that defendant had paid close to forty-
million dollars in fines); see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d at 960 
(“Caremark pleaded guilty to a single felony of mail fraud and agreed to pay 
civil and criminal fines.”). 
 192. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 368–69 (citing cases in which shareholders sued 
directors to personally repay, to the corporate treasury, the fine imposed on the 
business due to the directors’ own legal conduct). 
 193. See id. at 365 (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (determining a director’s duty to monitor)) (concluding that Caremark 
articulated the correct conditions for assessing director oversight liability). 
 194. See id. at 370 (“Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they 
breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in 
good faith.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The 
Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008) 
(“[T]he [Stone] court subsumed good faith into the duty of loyalty, a marriage we 
believe will prove most unwise.”). 
 195. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (noting that directors 
must oversee operations and use monitoring systems). 
 196. See id. at 368 (determining that a board must exercise good faith 
judgment when receiving compliance reports). 
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business.197 In Caremark the allegation was failing to monitor 
employees who violated the federal Anti-Referral Payments Law 
by providing kickbacks to doctors;198 in Stone the allegation was 
failing to monitor employees who violated the federal Bank 
Secrecy Act’s anti-money laundering regulations.199  
Failing to appreciate business risks, such as those from 
disruptive innovation, are outside the specter of illegal conduct. 
Indeed, in the important 2009 case of In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation,200 plaintiff-shareholders suing 
in the wake of the Great Recession tried to expand the monitoring 
duty to reach employee activity related to business risks.201 The 
claim in Citigroup was “based on defendants’ [directors’] alleged 
failure to properly monitor Citigroup’s business risk, specifically 
its exposure to the subprime mortgage market.”202 Then-
Chancellor Chandler rejected characterizing these as monitoring 
claims, instead describing them as classic duty-of-care claims 
“attempting to hold the director defendants personally liable for 
making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in 
hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company.”203 The former 
Chancellor wrote that “[w]hile it may be tempting to say that 
directors have the same duties to monitor and oversee business 
risk, imposing Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor 
                                                                                                     
 197. Id. at 364. 
 198. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 961, 964, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(alleging that Caremark’s board of directors breached their duty of care by 
“allow[ing] a situation to develop and continue which exposed the corporation to 
enormous legal liability,” which was in part due alleged “inappropriate referral 
payments” that violated the Anti-Referral Payments Law). 
 199. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 364–65 (alleging that the directors had breached 
their duty of oversight by “utterly fail[ing] to implement any sort of statutorily 
required monitoring, reporting or information controls that would have enabled 
them to learn” that company employees had not filed Suspicious Activity 
Reports, “as required by the federal Bank Secrecy Act”). 
 200. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 201. See generally id. 
 202. Id. at 123; see also id. at 130 (contrasting another recent monitoring 
case, AIG, and noting that “[u]nlike the allegations in this case, the defendants 
in AIG allegedly failed to exercise reasonable oversight over pervasive 
fraudulent and criminal conduct”). 
 203. Id. at 124. 
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business risk is fundamentally different.”204 This decision has 
been both criticized205 and supported.206  
2. The Duty to Monitor and Risks from Disruptive Innovation 
The duty of monitoring in its current formulation does not 
mandate that directors monitor for business risks, including the 
risk their business will be disrupted by a startup.207 Limiting the 
duty to monitor to illegal employee activity makes sense due to 
slippery slope possibilities.208 Further, this is not a normative 
Article where I reflexively urge expansion of the monitoring duty 
to encourage more intrapreneurship. Still, I believe the duty to 
monitor will encourage intrapraneurship for three reasons. 
First, as a matter of legal liability, it is possible to 
distinguish Citigroup’s facts from disruptive innovation concerns. 
                                                                                                     
 204. Id. at 131. 
 205. See Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical 
Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 245 (2011) 
(“What is the point of making the duty to monitor more robust if directors never 
face out-of-pocket liability?”). Hillary Sale, writing about the duty to monitor 
before Citigroup, cites the case of a General Motors board member who resigned 
because management was not adequately informing the board, including by not 
timely sending out materials before board meetings. Sale, supra note 185, at 
743–44. Sale notes that while the GM situation “does not arise in the context of 
criminal liability for individuals or the corporation, the lack of ongoing 
information and preparation by the GM board is, if true, arguably a breach of its 
good-faith Caremark/Stone obligations.” Id. at 744. More recent decisions do not 
seem to have borne this out. 
 206. See Hurt supra note 39, at 259 (2014) (arguing that “not only does a 
duty to manage financial risk not exist within the prevailing corporate law 
framework of duties, but also that recognizing a separate duty to manage 
financial risk would be imprudent” (citation omitted)); Robert T. Miller, 
Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 47, 103–05 (2010) (arguing that expanding the duty to monitor to risk-
management failures would eviscerate business judgment rule); see also Martin 
Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 479 (2011) (concluding that the duty to 
monitor as currently applied “works, and, contrary to what many critics say, 
strikes the correct balances between directors’ accountability and authority”). 
 207. See In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (determining that directors 
are only liable for a failure to monitor due to a sustained or systematic failure to 
exercise oversight). 
 208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing 
the imprudence of expanding directors’ duty to monitor). 
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In Citigroup, Chancellor Chandler discusses how entertaining a 
monitoring claim on these facts would essentially be punishing 
directors for taking a risk.209 Recall that Citigroup lost money by 
betting on subprime mortgages.210 Taking risks is exactly the sort 
of thing the business judgment rule is supposed to protect, and 
thus Chancellor Chandler properly analyzed Citigroup under the 
duty of care.211 But identifying risks posed by disruptive 
innovation is different. A board being unaware—that the relevant 
information is not filtering to the top—is properly in the realm of 
monitoring since no business judgment is being made.212 Still, 
given the realities of corporate law decisions, I doubt legal 
liability will lie anytime soon for failing to identify a business 
risk. 
The more likely result is that the duty to monitor in its 
limited scope will function concurrently with market pressures to 
influence management to better monitor for business risks.213 
Market pressures are already causing boards to monitor for 
business risks just as they do for law compliance.214 For example, 
                                                                                                     
 209. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 126. 
 210. See id. at 112 (outlining Citigroup’s exposure to subprime mortgages). 
 211. See id. at 124 (analyzing the liability for director defendants by using 
the business judgment rule). Another Caremark case, Massey Energy, is also 
distinguishable, as it focuses not only on monitoring but also on management 
causing the corporation to violate applicable law. See In re Massey Energy Co., 
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, *74 (2011) (“Massey continued to think it knew better 
than those charged with enforcing the law, and in fact often argued with the law 
itself.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) 
(“Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the 
activities of the corporation.”). Although the Citigroup opinion could be read 
more broadly to close the door on even this possibility as a matter of law. See In 
re Citigroup, 964 A.2d. at 131 (“Oversight duties under Delaware law are not 
designed to subject directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for 
failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”).  
 213. Also, as it often does, federal securities law is working in tandem with 
Delaware corporate law on risk identification. The SEC has new rules requiring 
public corporations to give more disclosure about their risk monitoring practices. 
See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,344 (Dec. 29, 2009) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). 
 214. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 570 (2003) (“Directors are held 
accountable to shareholder interests through a variety of market forces, such as 
the capital and reputational markets.”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (stating that a 
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Hewlett-Packard has a technology committee, which is 
responsible for recommendations to the board on technology 
strategies, execution of technology strategies, and guidance on 
technology.215 Other companies have committees very specific to 
their industry and relevant technologies. Boeing, for example, has 
a Special Programs Committee, which reviews classified 
programs the company has undertaken on behalf of the U.S. 
Government.216 While not explicitly stated, these programs are 
likely dealing with R&D and product innovation issues.217 
J.P.Morgan, in the face of huge losses, adopted new technologies 
to monitor for rogue traders.218 The technology, which was 
originally developed for counter-terrorism efforts, uses an 
algorithm to electronically analyze patterns in human 
communications—identifying potential collusions and allowing 
J.P.Morgan to proactively intervene regarding both legal and 
business matters.219  
                                                                                                     
company that does not generate a good return for its shareholders will likely see 
a drop in the market price of its shares against the shares of other companies in 
the same industry). 
 215. Hewlett-Packard Company Board of Directors: Technology Committee 
Charter, HEWLETT-PACKARD 1, 2–3 (Nov. 19, 2014), http://h30261. 
www3.hp.com/~/media/Files/H/HP-IR/documents/others/technology-committee-
charter.pdf. In particular, “Guidance on Technology” includes providing 
guidance on such things as investments, R&D investments, and market entry 
and exit, among other responsibilities. Id. at 3.  
 216. Special Programs Committee Charter, BOEING 1 (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/company/general_info/pdf/charte
r_special_programs.pdf.  
 217. See John E. Pepper, “Best Practice” Boards and CEOs, CORPORATE 
BOARD, July 2008, at 1 (quoting a former Chairman and CEO at Procter & 
Gamble, who pointed to other examples of directors focused on such topics as 
innovation, thinking of the customers in developing nations, and diversifying 
management). 
 218. See Hugh Son, JPMorgan Algorithm Knows You’re a Rogue Employee 
Before You Do, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/jpmorgan-algorithm-knows-
you-re-a-rogue-employee-before-you-do (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (explaining 
that with large Wall Street investment banks losing billions of dollars in fines 
for illegal employee actions, the $6.2 billion London Whale trading loss, and 
riggings of currency and energy markets, JPMorgan has created an internal 
surveillance system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 219. See id. (describing how the software reads language used in emails to 
decipher a potentially rogue employee’s intentions). 
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Layering on even further, pronouncements of the Delaware 
courts—even absent corresponding liability—can work with these 
market pressures to affect director behavior. In a well-known 
article, Ed Rock argues that Delaware courts pen “corporate law 
sermons,” or “parables—instructive tales—of good managers and 
bad managers . . .”220 that are more standards than rules.221 
Because corporate managers of large Delaware corporations 
“form a surprisingly small and close-knit community,” these 
standards are consumed by corporate lawyers and communicated 
to managers, thus influencing managers’ behavior.222  
Similarly, per Melvin Eisenberg, one can think of Delaware 
courts as providing both standards of conduct and standards of 
review.223 Standards of conduct are aspirational and directed to 
primary actors (directors), whereas standards of review are 
where liability actually lies for nonperformance and are directed 
at reviewing bodies (courts).224 Thus, for the monitoring duty, 
Delaware judges could pronounce a broad duty to monitor as a 
standard of conduct, yet keep monitoring for law compliance as 
the narrower standard of review.225  
The trick is to get directors to “hear” the conduct rules and 
act better than legally required, while judges hear the review 
rules—thus noting the aspirations but permitting greater leeway 
                                                                                                     
 220. Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporation 
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
 221. See id. at 1015–16 (explaining that a narrative process generates 
standards that are difficult to reduce into a rule). 
 222. Id. at 1017; cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811–12 (2001) (pointing out that while American society in 
general is less close-knit than in the past, corporations and corporate directors 
form a relatively enmeshed community).  
 223. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 462 (1993) 
(differentiating between a standard of conduct and a standard of review); see 
generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
 224. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 223, at 630 (explaining that a conduct rule 
prohibits a criminal from acting illegally, while a decision rule explains how a 
judge should decide cases involving the criminal’s illegal act). 
 225. See Eisenberg, supra note 223, at 463 (arguing that a discrepancy 
between a standard of conduct for the general public and a standard of review 
for courts allows a legislature to regulate conduct while allowing for leniency 
toward violations of that conduct in court). 
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before imposing liability. In the real world, such acoustic 
separation between conduct rules and review rules may be mere 
aspirational thinking. For example, in the case of the business 
judgment rule, well-counseled directors no doubt “hear” the 
permissive liability rule as well as the aspirational directive to 
follow best practices.226 However, directors may have bounded 
rationality and are less familiar with newer laws such as the duty 
to monitor, which may help the acoustic separation work 
better.227 Thus, Delaware judges should inspire directors to 
monitor for all important risks to their businesses, but only hold 
them liable for failing for law compliance. In these ways, then, 
the duty to monitor can speak—albeit softly—to the asymmetric 
information problem. 
V. Corporate Venture Capital 
Finally, this Article turns to what may be the best way for 
large corporations to develop an innovation strategy: corporate 
venture capital. This Part first describes corporate venture 
capital. Second, it details what appear to be competitive 
advantages of corporate venture capital over private venture 
capital in funding startups. Finally, this Part shows that the real 
evidence on corporate venture capital success is a mixed bag, and 
explores possible reasons for that outcome. 
A. Basics of Corporate Venture Capital 
What if large corporations can continue focusing on 
sustaining innovations but also avoid disruption? That balance 
would be the best of both worlds. This is what corporate venture 
capitalists (CVCs) allow large corporations to do.228 CVCs are 
                                                                                                     
 226. See id. (“In the real world, complete acoustic separation is not possible. 
As a result, each audience, general public and officials, may hear the rules 
addressed to the other.”). 
 227. See id. at 466–67 (“Although it is common to assume that individuals 
act rationally on the basis of full information, in fact most actors make decisions 
on the basis of bounded rationality involving limited information.”). 
 228. See Christian Guirnalda, Corporate Venture Capital is Back . . . But 
We’re in it for the Partnership, VERIZON VENTURES (Apr. 2, 2015), 
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venture arms established by a corporation. CVCs invest in 
promising startups, usually related to their parent corporation’s 
business,229 although some CVCs have a purely financial focus 
and invest in any startup that seems promising.230 As Josh 
Lerner writes: “A corporate VC fund . . . can move faster, more 
flexibly, and more cheaply than traditional R&D to help a firm 
respond to changes in technologies and business models.”231 
Importantly, Lerner also notes that a CVC “can serve as an 
intelligence-gathering initiative, helping a company to protect 
itself from emerging competitive threats.”232 
                                                                                                     
http://www.verizonventures.com/blog/2015/04/corporate-venture-capital-is-
back%E2%80%A6-but-we%E2%80%99re-in-it-for-the-partnership (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (describing how corporate venture capital projects allow large 
corporations to gain an edge in innovative ideas, while also avoiding high 
research and development expenses, as well as the bureaucracy of large 
corporate structures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 229. These are referred to as “strategic” investments because they 
complement the corporation’s core business. Id. For example, Verizon states 
that “the financial return can sometimes matter less than the innovation return 
for both the parent company and co-investors.” Id.; see also Paul A. Gompers & 
Josh Lerner, The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: 
Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities, in RANDALL K. 
MORCK, CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 19 (2000) (“Corporations are 
likely to benefit from indirect gains (e.g., strategic alliances and greater 
understanding of industry trends) as well as direct financial returns.”).  
 230. Corporate venture capital funds sometimes invest in unrelated sectors 
purely for financial gains. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 25 
(explaining that Xerox began its corporate venture capital program to maximize 
return on investment). This is less common, but is the strategy of Google 
Ventures, the largest corporate venture capital fund. See Rachel King, Corporate 
VC Investments Hold Steady Amid Broader Downturn in Market, WALL ST. J. 
(January 22, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/01/22/corporate-vc-
investments-hold-steady-amid-broader-downturn-in-market/ (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016) (noting that Google invests “for financial [not strategic] returns”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 231. Lerner, supra note 45. 
 232. Id.; see also Massimo G. Colombo, Evila Piva & Cristina 
Rossi-Lamastra, The Sensitivity of High-Tech Entrepreneurial Ventures’ 
Employment to a Sales Contraction in a Negative Growth Scenario: The 
Moderating Role of Venture Capital Financing, 35 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION 
ECON. 73, 76 (2014) (explaining that corporate venture capital gives parent 
corporations a view of “technological progress in leading-edge fields, which are 
surrounded by high uncertainty, without committing resources to internal 
research and development activities” (internal citations omitted)). 
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CVCs have been around almost as long as private venture 
capitalists (PVCs).233 The ten most active CVCs are arms of well-
known, mostly-tech corporations: Google Ventures, Intel Capital, 
Salesforce Ventures, Qualcomm Ventures, Comcast Ventures, 
Novartis Venture Funds, Samsung Ventures, Cisco Investments, 
Siemens Venture Capital, and SR One.234 CVCs appear to invest 
at all stages of startup development, although one study found 
they invested most often in the middle stages—i.e., not in very 
early rounds, or later when a startup is close to an IPO.235 
B. Advantages of Corporate Venture Capital over Private 
Venture Capital 
Corporate venture capital appears to enjoy real advantages 
over private venture capital as a funding option for startups.236 
To understand why, it is important to note that venture capital of 
any kind succeeds or fails based on a VC’s ability to select the 
right startups to fund ex ante investment and help them grow 
ex-post investment.237  
First, in terms of selecting startups to fund, the CVC’s 
managers should be able to bring to bear expertise from within 
the parent corporation.238 If the CVC has a strategic focus, as 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 21–22 (giving a brief history 
of CVC). 
 234. See The 104 Most Active Corporate VC Firms, CB INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/corporate-venture-capital-active-2014/ 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (listing the most active corporate venture capital 
programs in 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also If 
You Can’t Beat Them, Buy Them, ECONOMIST (January 14, 2016) (citing 
statistics that “[o]ver the past five years the number of corporate-venture units 
worldwide has doubled to 1,100; 25 of the 30 firms that comprise the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average have one”). 
 235. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 32 (“Corporate funds tend to 
invest slightly less frequently in start-up and mature private firms. Instead, 
they are disproportionately represented among companies in the middle stages, 
such as ‘development’ or ‘beta.’”). 
 236. See id. at 46 (noting that corporate venture investments seem to be at 
least as successful as private venture capital investments). 
 237. See id. (concluding that corporate venture programs must select 
programs that fall within the corporation’s overall strategic vision for the CVC 
to succeed). 
 238. Perhaps the CVC is staffed by former corporate executives. Even if it is 
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most do, its people should have substantial expertise in the 
startup technologies being funded.239 The corporation would also 
possess superior knowledge of the entrepreneur if she came from 
inside the corporation.240 Both of these advantages reduce pre-
investment uncertainty and information asymmetry in ways at 
least as effective as the PVC’s staged financing tool.241 
Second, in terms of growing startups ex–post investments, 
CVCs take board seats and closely monitor startups as PVCs 
do.242 Beyond what PVCs can offer, though, CVCs can also tap 
into the numerous resources of their parent corporations to add 
extra value to their portfolio startups.243 As Lerner writes: 
“Companies bring a lot of value to the start-ups they fund, in the 
form of reputation, skills, and of course, resources—from research 
scientists to sophisticated laboratories to armies of 
salespeople.”244 As an example, Google Ventures appears to be 
very involved with its portfolio startups—providing support to 
startups in the areas of security, PR, technology platforms, and 
                                                                                                     
not, the corporation’s people should be available for the CVC to consult. See 
Gina Dokko & Vibha Gaba, Venturing Into New Territory: Career Experiences of 
Corporate Venture Capital Managers and Practice Variation, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
563, 571 (2012) (exploring the prior work histories of CVC managers, including 
those coming from PVCs). 
 239. See id. at 566 (explaining that individuals with prior experience in a 
certain facet of business or entrepreneurism will better understand the 
problems involved in a new business or entrepreneurial project). 
 240. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 3, at 299 (explaining auctions 
between corporations and PVCs for employee talent). 
 241. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons 
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (identifying 
uncertainty and information asymmetry as pre-investment problems in startup 
investing); id. at 1078–79 (discussing staged financing as a PVC’s primary 
solution to these problems); see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 
Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of 
Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304 (2003) (“There is no 
evidence that the VC’s liquidation claim is larger when asymmetric information 
problems are more severe, because volatility, pre-revenue, and repeat 
entrepreneur are not significant.”).  
 242. See David Benson & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Corporate Venture Capital 
and the Returns to Acquiring Portfolio Companies, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 478, 479 
(2010) (citing prior studies that CVC managers “assume roles on [startup] 
boards of directors”).  
 243. See id. at 478–79 (“Corporate investors commonly provide technical and 
commercial advice to portfolio companies.”). 
 244. Lerner, supra note 45. 
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others.245 Google Venture’s “library” provides articles on design, 
product management, user research, hiring, engineering, 
marketing, entrepreneurship, and workshops.246 Google Ventures 
also provides a “Design Sprint” and “Research Sprint” for its 
portfolio startups.247 The Design Sprint is a five-day process that 
focuses on product design and prototyping.248 The Research 
Sprint is a four-day process providing startups with information 
on user research and how to utilize it.249 
These pre- and post-investment advantages over PVCs have 
led to CVC successes. Studies have found that CVC-backed 
                                                                                                     
 245. See Emily Chang, How Google Ventures Chooses Its Investments, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/808891df-
a754-4a62-8e10-49c7ec712565 (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (discussing how 
Google Ventures helps its investments) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also Brad Coffey, Will Google Disrupt Venture Capital?, 
FORTUNE (June 22, 2011), http://fortune.com/2011/06/22/will-google-disrupt-
venture-capital/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (explaining that Google is trying to 
continue its history of reinventing industries through its use of venture capital) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 246. See GV LIBRARY, http://www.gv.com/library/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) 
(listing articles discussing aspects of Google Ventures) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See THE DESIGN SPRINT, http://www.gv.com/sprint/ (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016) (describing multi-day processes for discussing business, design, 
prototyping, and testing ideas with customers) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also John Koetsier, How Google Ventures Does Rapid 
Prototyping ‘Design Sprints’ with Its 170 Startups, VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 14, 
2013) http://venturebeat.com/2013/08/14/how-google-venture-partners-does-
rapid-prototyping-design-sprints-with-its-170-startups/ (last visited Dec. 10, 
2016) (explaining how “Google Ventures built its own rapid prototyping process, 
with a defined five day schedule to understand the challenge, create multiple 
options, build multiple prototypes, and get real customer feedback”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Leena Rao, Inside a Google Ventures 
Design Sprint, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 23, 2013) 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/10/23/inside-a-google-ventures-design-sprint/ (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2016) (“Google offers its portfolio startups the opportunity to 
participate in a Design Sprint, which is an intensive, visual bootcamp around a 
design problem for portfolio companies.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 249. See Michael Margolis, The GV Research Sprint: A 4-day Process for 
Answering Important Startup Questions, GV (Aug. 4, 2014) 
https://library.gv.com/the-gv-research-sprint-a-4-day-process-for-answering-import 
ant-startup-questions-97279b532b25#.vhm0syds2 (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) 
(stating that four-day research sprints allow for testing of ideas without an 
actual launch of the idea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
INTRAPRENEURSHIP 1787 
startups that go public “produce more patents and patents that 
are of higher quality,”250 and that CVC investment has a positive 
signaling effect on upon a startup’s later IPO.251 Gompers and 
Lerner empirically found that CVC investments “appear to be at 
least as successful” as PVC investments, especially where the 
CVCs had a strategic (as opposed to financial) focus.252 The 
parent corporation benefits both through financial gains and by 
bringing the knowledge gained through CVC operations in-
house.253 
C. Why Corporate Venture Capital Doesn’t Dominate Private 
Venture Capital 
The advantages of corporate venture capital cited above beg 
the question: why doesn’t corporate venture capital dominate 
private venture capital instead of representing only about a tenth 
of it?254 One explanation is that CVCs and PVCs often co-invest 
and, therefore, it is not a competition or adversarial affair to 
begin with.255 In short, CVC does not wish to compete with PVC, 
just supplement it.256 Another explanation is that there are 
                                                                                                     
 250. Chemmanur, Loutskina & Tian, supra note 60, at 2437. 
 251. See Toby E. Stuart, Ha Hoang & Ralph C. Hybels, Interorganizational 
Endorsements and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 315, 315 (1999) (finding that startups with a prominent CVC investor launch 
IPOs more quickly and with higher valuations than startups without a 
prominent CVC investor). 
 252. Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 19. 
 253. See id. at 3 (stating that corporate venture investments benefit the 
parent corporations by providing direct financial returns and better 
understanding of industry trends). 
 254. See id. (explaining the benefits that large corporate structures can 
provide to their venture capital programs). 
 255. See Lerner, supra note 45 (noting that co-investors have the added 
value of forcing a CVC to more quickly cut ties with a failing startup). 
 256. In fact, private venture capital’s limited partnership structure, with 
funds having a ten-year life span, can put exit pressure on corporate venture 
capital, as CVCs are corporate subsidiaries and under no such life-span 
deadline. The PVC will push the CVC to make a quicker decision on exit than it 
otherwise might. See Gilson, supra note 20, at 1076 (“The fact that portfolio 
company investments are of limited duration rather than long term is critical to 
the operation of the venture capital market.”). But see Chemmanur, Loutskina 
& Tian, supra note 60, at 2435 (arguing that not having a ten-year lifespan is 
actually a positive that CVC has over PVC). 
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problems with corporate venture capital including: 1) instability 
and short-term focus; 2) inability to capitalize on knowledge 
spillovers that could flow from CVC-funded startups to parent 
corporations; and 3) inadequately compensating CVC fund 
managers.257 
First, corporate venture capital appears cyclical, and 
although that mirrors the cyclical nature of private venture 
capital,258 parent corporations tend to turn and cut bait on CVCs 
more quickly than PVCs do.259 When times are good—as in the 
last several years—corporate venture capital accounts for 
anywhere from 11–13% of all venture capital dollars invested.260 
In 2015, a particularly good year, CVCs “invested over $7.5 
billion in 905 deal to high-growth startups.”261 But the bad times 
are a different story. CVC investments dropped off precipitously 
after the stock market crash of 1987 and again after the dot-com 
crash of the late 1990s.262 Lerner estimates that a CVC’s life span 
may be as short as a year.263 This short-term focus may 
sometimes be due to corporate venture capital’s mostly strategic 
nature; once the technological need of the corporation is met, the 
                                                                                                     
 257. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 45 (listing structural 
problems, lower compensation of investors, and short time frame of corporate 
investments as CVC’s disadvantages). 
 258. See id. at 22 (writing in 2000 that “corporate involvement in venture 
capital has mirrored (perhaps even in an exaggerated manner) the cyclical 
nature of the entire venture capital industry over the past three decades”). 
 259. See Lerner, supra note 45 (explaining that a corporation can often more 
easily jettison a poorly performing venture investment than they can abandon 
internally developed innovations). 
 260. See King, supra note 230 (citing statistics that corporate venture 
capital accounted “for 13 percent of all venture capital dollars invested [in 2015], 
and 21 percent of all deals”); Lerner, supra note 45 (“In the first half of 
2011 . . . more than 11% of the VC dollars invested came from corporate venture 
funds, a level not seen since the dot-com bubble.”). 
 261. King, supra note 230; see also Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 242, at 
478 (“From 1980 through 2003, established firms invested over $40 billion in 
entrepreneurial ventures.”). 
 262. See Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 242, at 480 (explaining that 
investment in venture capital firms “subsided with the plummet in technology 
markets”). 
 263. See Lerner, supra note 45 (“[l]arge companies have been wary of 
corporate venturing . . . . The median life span of these funds has been about one 
year.”). 
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startup investment is no longer necessary.264 Or perhaps some 
CVC arms are CEO pet projects, and thus not part of long-term 
corporate strategy.265 Either way, the instability of corporate 
venture capital may cause promising entrepreneurs to prefer 
funding from private venture capital.266 
Second, to fully capitalize on corporate venture capital’s 
potential, the knowledge gained from strategic startup 
investments must find its way back to the parent corporation.267 
If not, this is not really a hybrid form of intrapreneurship at all, 
but merely the same as any other corporate financial investment. 
There are alternative ways to bring the knowledge from CVC 
portfolio startups back into the parent corporation. One way is to 
acquire the startup once it develops.268 However, a recent 
empirical study found poor returns to corporations acquiring 
their own CVC–funded startups.269 Indeed, my own research into 
the top CVCs revealed that they do not often acquire their 
portfolio startups.270  
                                                                                                     
 264. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 19 (“[I]t may be that 
corporations need to employ such programs only during periods of severe 
technological discontinuity. After such periods of rapid change pass, the 
programs are no longer needed.”). 
 265. See Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 242, at 489 (citing studies for the 
proposition that a “common criticism against corporate venturing programs is 
their use to fund CEO ‘pet projects’”). 
 266. See id. (questioning why takeovers of portfolio companies often 
drastically reduce value for shareholders of CVC investors). 
 267. See Gary Dushnitsky & J. Myles Shaver, Limitations to Inter-
Organizational Knowledge Acquisition: The Paradox of Corporate Venture 
Capital, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 1045, 1045 (2009) (noting that a corporation will 
often not invest in an entrepreneur’s invention unless the entrepreneur 
discloses details about his invention).  
 268. See Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 242, at 479 (examining whether 
investors earn positive returns when they acquire startups). 
 269. See id. at 489 (explaining the methodology of their study on returns on 
investment for corporations acquiring CVC–backed startups). 
 270. For example, Google Ventures had fifteen of its portfolio startups 
acquired in 2014, but only three of these were acquired by Google. See GV Year 
in Review: 2014, GV, http://www.gv.com/2014/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (listing 
the various achievements and exits of Google Venture companies) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Salesforce Ventures has had twenty-one 
portfolio startups with an exit event since 2011; of the acquisitions, only two 
were undertaken by Salesforce. See Salesforce Ventures Exits, CRUNCHBASE, 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/salesforce-ventures/exits/all/global 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (listing Salesforce ventures and the type of exit of 
1790 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1741 (2016) 
A second way of effecting knowledge spillovers is to obtain 
information from portfolio startups while they are developing 
absent a parent company acquisition. CVCs sometimes appear to 
have problems facilitating this type of knowledge spillover.271 As 
Lerner observes: “Knowledge doesn’t automatically flow from 
start-ups to the large organizations that have invested in them,” 
and that there is “a cultural gap between the young MBAs who 
dominate most venture teams and the firm’s senior executives.”272 
He suggests, citing the CIA’s example of In-Q-Tel, that “linked 
units” can be the bridge that transfers relevant information to the 
parent.273 Another paper sounded a similar note, stating that 
“CVC managers needed to be deeply embedded in the social 
networks of both the start-up venture and the incumbent” and 
needed to function as “knowledge brokers.”274 But large 
corporations are not always good at facilitating this knowledge 
spillover. 
A final problem with corporate venture capital is adequately 
compensating the managers running the funds. Private venture 
capital fund managers make substantial returns on carried 
interest, or the profits made on a portfolio startup’s exit.275 
                                                                                                     
each venture) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Likewise, 
Intel appears to rarely acquire companies in which Intel Capital has invested. 
See Eric Blattberg, Intel Capital Saw More Exits than Sequoia, Greylock, or 
Google Ventures Last Year, VENTURE BEAT (May 8, 2014) 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/05/08/intel-capital-saw-more-exits-than-sequoia-
greylock-or-google-ventures-last-year/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (“Intel Capital 
has the mandate to get the best exit possible for Intel Corp., not to serve as a 
feeder for Intel Corp.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
These findings do not include strategic alliances or licensing agreements made 
between parent corporations and CVC portfolio startups, which may be another 
way the parent corporation becomes more intrapreneurial through corporate 
venture capital programs. 
 271. See Lerner, supra note 45 (“The barriers to knowledge transfer are 
many: The corporate venturing and business development groups may be 
located far from the firm’s central operations. Everyone is busy with day-to-day 
tasks.”). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id.  
 274. Thomas Keil, Erkko Autio & Gerard George, Corporate Venture 
Capital, Disembodied Experimentation and Capability Development, 45 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 1475, 1491 (2008). 
 275. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (“Because private equity 
funds are leanly staffed, a carried interest worth millions of dollars may be split 
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Corporate venture capital fund managers, on the other hand, are 
compensated like comparable employees in parent corporations: 
through salaries and bonuses.276 As a result, corporate venture 
capital fund managers make far less than their private venture 
capital counterparts, and often leave for them, resulting in a 
talent drain at CVCs.277 
Remedying the problem is not easy. Just as it is difficult to 
compensate intrapreneurial employees like entrepreneurs,278 it is 
challenging to compensate corporate venture capital fund 
managers like their private venture capital fund counterparts 
without creating interorganizational issues.279 General Electric’s 
CVC arm lost many people to private venture capital firms in 
1998 and 1999 for this reason.280 The practical effect of this talent 
drain further negates the seeming advantages of corporate 
venture capital over private venture capital. 
One way to overcome these obstacles is for the parent 
corporation to design a strong corporate venture capital 
program.281 Studies have found that a CVC’s likelihood of success 
increases if the parent corporation establishes dedicated units 
(e.g., subsidiaries), rather than housing the corporate venture 
                                                                                                     
among just a handful of individuals.”). 
 276. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 23 (“Corporations have 
frequently been reluctant to compensate their venture managers through profit-
sharing (‘carried-interest’) provisions.”); Lerner, supra note 45 (“[C]orporate 
leaders are typically troubled by the disparity between what venture managers 
expect to earn and the compensation of executives with comparable seniority in 
other parts of the company.”). 
 277. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 45 (“[F]ield research 
suggests that corporate venture groups are often plagued by defections of their 
most successful investors, who become frustrated at their low level of 
compensation.”). 
 278. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (examining financial 
incentives for employees). 
 279. See Edward P. Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. 
ECON. 561, 562 (1989) (explaining how a large disparity in salaries for similarly 
situated employees within a company can result in decreased cooperation and 
even sabotage among these employees). 
 280. See Lerner, supra note 45 (“Corporations that fail to provide adequate 
incentives [to the corporation’s private venture capital investors] face a steady 
stream of defections once junior investors master the venture process.”). 
 281. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 229, at 18 (emphasizing the 
importance of having a strong link between a corporate parent’s strategic focus 
and the venture capital group’s investment focus). 
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capital operation inside the parent.282 Although the results of 
CVC-funded startup acquisitions have not been good, one study 
found that when parent corporations later acquired their CVC’s 
portfolio startups, financial returns were significantly higher 
“when managers from dedicated CVC units [were] responsible for 
the initial funding decision.”283 The authors of that study state: 
“Investors that house CVC programs in autonomous 
organizational units realize more favorable outcomes than do 
corporate investors with less systematized programs.”284  
VI. Conclusion 
This Article examined how corporate law plays at the 
margins to influence the intrapreneurship/entrepreneurship 
balance we observe. It also explores the hybrid option of large 
corporations funding startups through corporate venture capital 
projects, rather than competing with them. To close with a bit 
more on the entrepreneurial/intrapreneurial balance, a recent 
Harvard Business Review article offers three business reasons 
why large corporations will become increasingly important to 
innovation going forward.285 
First, large corporations have competitive advantages due to 
brand recognition and staying power, whereas startups 
increasingly encounter rivals due to shorter product development 
cycles and an abundance of financing.286 In other words, due to 
                                                                                                     
 282. Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 242, at 491 (noting that prior studies 
demonstrate that firms often more easily find managers with backgrounds in 
finance or private equity when they organize their CVCs into autonomous 
subsidiaries). 
 283. Id. at 494. 
 284. Id. at 496. 
 285. See Scotty D. Anthony, The New Corporate Garage, HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 4 
(Sept. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/09/the-new-corporate-garage (last visited Dec. 
11, 2016) (listing the decreasing cost of innovation, large companies adopting 
open innovation, and business) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 286. See id. at 5 (“[Startups] are increasingly vulnerable to the same capital-
market pressures that plague big companies—but before they’ve developed 
lasting corporate assets.”). Conversely, it could be argued that the abundance of 
capital and cheap cost of launching a startup would create more 
entrepreneurship relative to intrapreneurship, not less. See Coyle & Polsky, 
supra note 53, at 292–93 (noting that the cost of launching certain types of 
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their newness, startups do not enjoy the same entrenchment as 
large corporations and can more easily be disrupted 
themselves.287 Second, large corporations are more openly 
embracing innovation and nimbleness to stay competitive.288 
Finally, much innovation in recent years has involved innovative 
business models, which play to large corporations’ strengths 
better than innovative product technologies.289  
For these reasons, intrapreneurship is important to study. 
And while the law may be a relatively minor factor in influencing 
where innovation occurs, it does have a previously unexplored 
role that is important for legal scholars to understand. 
                                                                                                     
startups, notably software startups, has decreased significantly since the rise of 
cloud computing and that the amount and variety of funding for new startups is 
more abundant than ever). 
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